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Lightning Still Strikes
EVIDENCE FROM THE POPULAR PRESS THAT
DEATH SENTENCING CONTINUES TO BE
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ARBITRARY MORE THAN
THREE DECADES AFTER FURMAN
David McCord†
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that
being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people
convicted of . . . murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as
reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capriciously
selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in
fact been imposed.

Justice Potter Stewart, concurring in Furman v. Georgia, 19721
I must arrive at judgment; and I can do no more than state a
conclusion based on 10 years of almost daily exposure to the facts
and circumstances of hundreds and hundreds of federal and state
criminal cases involving crimes for which death is the authorized
penalty. That conclusion, as I have said, is that the death penalty is
exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes
and that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.

Justice Byron White, concurring in Furman v. Georgia, 19722

†
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Caufield of Drake University’s Department of Politics and International Relations,
Timothy S. Eckley, Esq., of the American Judicature Society, Professor Michael Heise
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School of Law (Minneapolis).
1
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
2
Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
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When the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial number of
cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is virtually
inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily . . . . [I]t is highly
implausible that only the worst criminals or the criminals who
commit the worst crimes are selected for this punishment.

Justice William Brennan, concurring in Furman v. Georgia,
19723
People do worse crimes than this and they’re still alive.

Defendant Michael Rush, primary participant in a deatheligible murder, 20044
INTRODUCTION
This Article began not as a law journal piece, but as a
modest project for posting information about death-sentenced
defendants on a website. The expansion of the project into this
Article is a tale of startling, not to mention humbling,
discoveries. As a law professor who has taught a death penalty
course for over a decade, read hundreds of death penalty
appellate opinions, and written several articles on aspects of
the topic,5 I am an expert in the field. One of the things I
imagined I could do as an expert was “handicap” death-eligible
cases—predict which cases were likely to result in death
sentences, and which ones were not. In retrospect, it is evident
to me that this conceit was based on a biased sample—almost
all the cases I read were ones in which defendants were
sentenced to death. Rarely did I read a case in which the
sentencer chose a non-death sentence, or a prosecutor did not
pursue a death sentence. Since most defendants who receive
death sentences are good candidates for them (at least based on
aggravating circumstances), assessing the likelihood of death
sentences in death-sentenced cases is in the nature of a selffulfilling prophecy. Once I began reading about death-eligible
cases that resulted in non-death sentences, however, I realized
that I had no capacity whatsoever to handicap death-eligible
cases.
3

Id. at 293-94 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Jason Trahan, Suspect in Slaying Says He Hit but Didn’t Kill; Plano Man
Fingers Other Roommate; Officer Says Shifting Blame Is Common, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, May 21, 2004, at 3B.
5
Most recently, see, e.g., David McCord, Switching Juries in Midstream:
The Perplexities of Penalty-Phase-Only Retrials, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 215 (2004).
4
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Of course, if this insight were simply about my
deficiency, it would not warrant your reading this Article. This
insight can be broadened: nobody else can handicap deatheligible cases, either. In turn, this can be even further
broadened into a crucial, legally-significant point: death
sentencing in 2004 was so unpredictable that the 1972 Furman
quotations above, from Justices Stewart, White, and Brennan,
still exactly describe the death penalty system more than three
decades later; and the street-level insight of defendant Michael
Rush neatly captures the essence of the current system. Could
I prove to the satisfaction of the Supreme Court that the
current system is arbitrary?6 Probably not—I only know what I
read in the newspapers. What the newspapers disclose,
however, is a pattern so apparently arbitrary that it raises a
strong inference that the current system is just as
unconstitutional as the pre-Furman system.
An obvious question is: Why rely on newspaper
reports—can we do better than that? The answer is “no,” we
cannot do better than that, at least not without a national
homicide reporting system that is much more complete and
detailed than we have now.7 There is simply no system in
effect anywhere in the country (other than in New Jersey8) to
keep track of the occurrence of death-eligible cases, their
factual details, and their resolutions. Indeed, before the recent
development of searchable online newspaper databases, there
was no way to even attempt the task this Article sets for itself:
to analyze through press reports as many death-eligible cases
resolved in 2004 as possible. While the newspaper results are

6
I could have chosen “capricious” or “unpredictable” as the key descriptor,
but decided on “arbitrary” as the most legally descriptive adjective.
7
The federal government collects a great deal of information on homicides
nationwide, but the information is not collected specifically for death-sentencing
purposes. Thus, the information is not detailed enough to be very helpful in making
the kinds of subtle distinctions on which death sentencing hinges. For an overview of
the homicide data available through federal databases, see the Uniform Crime
Reporting Program Resource Guide, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/NACJD/ucr.html (last
visited Jan. 27, 2006) (follow the “Agency-Level Data” hyperlink).
8
At the direction of the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Administrative
Office of the New Jersey Courts has been collecting detailed data on all death-eligible
murders in the state since 1989, primarily to attempt to ascertain whether race
influences death sentencing. For a description of this project, see David C. Baldus et
al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An
Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL
L. REV. 1638, 1662-64 (1998) (explaining the study and its purposes, and adapting the
methodology for use in a study in Philadelphia). The details of this New Jersey data,
however, are not available to the general public.
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imperfect,9 they are still valuable; and for the time being, they
constitute the best available data upon which to apply a
renewed Furman analysis.
My odyssey of discovery began when I undertook a
second job as the inaugural Director of the National Jury
Center of the American Judicature Society in 2004. One of my
first tasks was to create a website for the Center. Given my
interest in capital punishment and the Supreme Court’s recent
affirmation of the importance of juries in death sentencing in
the Ring10 decision, I decided to devote one section of the
website to brief summaries of the cases of all defendants who
were sentenced to death in the United States in 2004. One
might imagine that such a compilation already existed—it did
not. Nor was it easy to create.11 As part of this task, I began
searching a broad query—“death /s [in the same sentence as]
sentence”—in the enormous Westlaw “USNEWS” and the Lexis
“USNEWSPAPERS” databases (which together constitute a
compilation of articles from several hundred newspapers). This
search turned up news reports on three types of cases: where
death sentences were imposed, where sentencers declined to
impose death sentences, and where prosecutors chose not to
pursue death sentences.12
Curiosity got the best of me. I began reading reports
about the cases that did not result in death sentences. I
quickly felt my handicapping confidence severely shaken.
Soon, it evaporated entirely. Often I would read a news report
and ask myself, “How could the jury not have imposed a death
sentence in that case?” or “Why in the world did the prosecutor
bargain away a death sentence in that case?” On the other
hand, occasionally I would find myself asking, “What induced a
prosecutor to seek, and a jury to impose, a death sentence in
that case?” Those questions prompted further investigation
and analysis that led to this Article.
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I analyzes the
legal forces that have formed the current death penalty system.
The analysis cuts through the jungle of Supreme Court

9

See infra text accompanying note 107.
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (holding that it is
unconstitutional for a judge rather than a jury to find aggravating circumstances
making defendant death-eligible).
11
See infra pp. 826-828.
12
As well as a multitude of inapt references, such as: “The two early defeats
do not necessarily constitute a death sentence for the Ravens’ season.”
10
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doctrine to the Court’s core goal in regulating capital
punishment: achieving a non-arbitrary system. Because the
Court has never described what a non-arbitrary system would
look like, Part I proposes a four-part litmus test for nonarbitrariness. The test asks whether the system 1) selects for
death only the most aggravated, “worst of the worst”13
defendants; 2) imposes death sentences on a robust proportion
of them; 3) achieves a death-sentencing rate that increases
with aggravation level; and 4) excludes the “worst of the worst”
from death sentences only for merits-based reasons. Part I
13
There is some agreement across the philosophical spectrum that if we are
to have a death penalty system, it should select only the “worst of the worst” for
execution. See, e.g., James S. Liebman et al., Executive Summary: A Broken System,
Part II: Why There Is So Much Error in Capital Cases, and What Can Be Done About
It, www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/index2.html (2002) (follow “Executive
Summary” hyperlink) (“Our main finding indicates that if we are going to have the
death penalty, it should be reserved for the worst of the worst . . . .”); Symposium,
Rethinking the Death Penalty: Can We Define Who Deserves Death?, 24 PACE L. REV.
107, 123-24 (2003) (Statement of death penalty proponent Professor Robert Blecker)
(“[T]hese comments today are about the ‘worst of the worst.’ This is the substance of
death penalty law. . . . We search for bad character, for evil, for the ‘worst of the worst’
criminal and not merely the ‘worst of the worst’ crime.” (emphasis in original)); id. at
133 (death penalty opponent Professor Jeffrey Kirchmeier) (“[The system] is set up now
to try to get the ‘worst of the worst,’ but it does not achieve that. . . . Throughout
history, the goal always has been to get ‘the worst of the worst.’”); id. at 148 (death
penalty researcher Professor Jeffrey Fagan) (“The ‘worst of the worst’ argument is a
policy prescription that would minimize error rates. . . . It would be preferable to define
the ‘worst of the worst’ and confine the use of the death penalty to those individuals. . .
.”). See also David Baldus, When Symbols Clash: Reflections on the Future of the
Comparative Proportionality Review of Death Sentences, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1582,
1605 (1996) (urging that death eligibility be limited to “multiple killings, defendants
with prior murder convictions, contract killings, police victim cases, extreme torture,
and sexual assaults with particular violence and terror”); Alex Kozinski & Sean
Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 31
(1995) (quoting pro-death penalty Ninth Circuit Judge Kozinski: “[W]e would ensure
that the few who suffer the death penalty really are the worst of the very bad—mass
murderers, hired killers, terrorists. This is surely better than the current system,
where we load our death rows with many more than we can possibly execute, and then
pick those who will actually die essentially at random.” (footnote omitted)).
The “worst of the worst” idea has worked its way down into “the trenches”
of working lawyers. See, e.g., James Merriweather, Penalty Phase Begins for Keyser,
NEWS JOURNAL (Del.), Nov. 18, 2004, at B1 (asking the jury to consider his client’s
alleged retardation, defense counsel said, “The death penalty, ladies and gentlemen, is
for the worst of the worst.”); Vic Ryckaert, Details Revealed in Girl’s Death,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 5, 2005, at B2 (quoting local prosecutor saying as to girl’s
murderer: “Capital punishment ought to be reserved for the worst of the worst, and he
is a prime candidate for the ultimate sanction.”); Andrea F. Siegel, Murderer Sorry for
Everyone’s Losses: Family of 2 Slain Victims not Convinced of Remorse; Judge
Considers Death Penalty, BALTIMORE SUN, Dec. 15, 2004, at 1B (arguing for his client’s
life, defense counsel stated that “as a human being, he . . . is not the worst of the
worst.”); Diana Walsh et al., Jury Recommends Death for Scott Peterson, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON., Dec. 13, 2004, at A1 (addressing jury, prosecutor in highly
publicized Scott Peterson trial argued during the penalty phase, “Scott Peterson is the
worst of the worst because he’s the kind of person that no one ever sees coming.”).
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then analyzes the Court’s capital jurisprudence, along with
other structural elements of the system, and shows how the
potential for arbitrariness is built into the system in many
ways.
Part II, along with the Appendices, presents and
analyzes factual evidence from the popular press. This Part
collects the most complete roster of death-eligible cases
resulting in sentences during calendar year 2004, together with
the richest factual summaries that could be compiled from
online news sources.14 The cases are divided into three groups:
those in which death sentences were imposed, those in which
sentencers rejected death sentences, and those in which
prosecutors chose not to pursue death sentences. Part II
develops a “Depravity Point Calculator” that analyzes and
ranks defendants in all three groups along a continuum from
most depraved to least depraved. The analysis also considers
mitigation evidence. This Part then compares the three sets of
cases using the four-part litmus test from Part I. This
comparison leads to the Article’s key conclusion: the news
reports raise a strong inference that more than three decades
after Furman, death sentences are still being imposed on a
“capriciously selected random handful”;15 and Justice White’s
description of the system’s operation is just as apt today as it
was in 1972: “[T]he death penalty is exacted with great
infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and . . . there is
no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it
is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”16
Part III considers whether a renewed Furman argument
stands any realistic prospect of acceptance by the Court. The
14
According to official government figures, the year 2004 is typical, at least
in the sense that it had approximately the same number of death sentences as the
three years immediately preceding it: 2004—125, 2003—144, 2002—168, and 2001—
164. See THOMAS P. BONCZAR AND TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF
JUST.
STATISTICS
BULL.,
CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT,
2003
14
(2004),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp03.pdf. The number of death sentences each
year for 1994-2000 was significantly higher, ranging from a high of 327 in both 1994
and 1995, down to 234 in 2000. Id. at 8. The trend was generally downward, although
with slight up-ticks in 1998 and 1999 over 1997. Id. It is impossible to determine
whether 2004 was typical in terms of the kinds of murders that resulted in resolutions
of the death penalty issue because no database, such as has been compiled in this
Article, has been compiled for earlier years. But there is no reason to believe that 2004
was atypical, and this Article will proceed on the premise that 2004 is fairly
representative of the way the capital punishment system in the United States has
operated, at least over about the last four years.
15
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
16
Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
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conclusion is that the odds of acceptance are long—but where
there’s life, there’s hope.
I. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
A. Furman Re-examined
Before Furman, all but six American death penalty
jurisdictions had a one-stage procedure for determining
whether death sentences should be imposed—evidence of the
crime was presented at trial, and the sentencer then retired to
deliberate whether the defendant was guilty, and if he was,
whether he should be sentenced to death. Sentencers received
little or no guidance on how to decide the death sentence issue.
The other six jurisdictions (California, Connecticut, Georgia,
New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas) had two-stage processes
where the issue of punishment was considered in a separate
proceeding after the guilt determination, but still with little or
no guidance given to the sentencer.17 The Furman Court held
both one-stage and two-stage systems unconstitutional. The
rationale for doing so was murky, however, because there was
no majority opinion. Rather, each of the five Justices in the
majority wrote a separate opinion, with some overlapping
rationales, and some rationales peculiar to particular Justices.
The most commonly asserted rationale, partially relied upon by
Justices Douglas18 and Brennan,19 and largely relied upon by
Justices Stewart20 and White,21 was that lack of standards to
guide sentencers resulted in an unconstitutionally arbitrary
distribution of death sentences. Justice Brennan summarized
the nature of the unconstitutional arbitrariness:
When the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial number of the
cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is virtually
inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily . . . . When the rate
of infliction is at this low level, it is highly implausible that only the

17
See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (noting that those six
states had two-stage processes, id. at 208 n.19, but that under all then-existing
procedures “the decision whether the defendant should live or die was left to the
absolute discretion of the jury,” id. at 185, and that such standardless death penalty
procedures challenged by the two petitioners “are those by which most capital trials in
this country are conducted.” Id. at 221).
18
Furman, 408 U.S. at 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
19
Id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring).
20
Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
21
Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
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worst criminals or the criminals who commit the worst crimes are
selected for this punishment.22

Justice Brennan thus identified arbitrariness as
resulting from five components: 1) broadly drafted statutes
rendering many defendants death-eligible; 2) a low rate of
death sentencing; 3) “over-inclusion”—imposition of death
sentences on defendants who were not among the worst
offenders; 4) “under-inclusion”—imposition of non-death
sentences on many defendants who were among the worst
offenders; and 5) implicitly, lack of procedures to minimize
over- and under-inclusion. This has become the well-known
Furman holding: a system that dispenses death sentences to
only a relative handful among a large universe of death-eligible
defendants, without guiding standards, in a manner that does
not sufficiently correlate with culpability of the defendants, is
constitutionally deficient. 23
There was, however, another holding of Furman that
has faded into relative obscurity in light of the Court’s later
capital jurisprudence: the Court has the power to make a
nationwide assessment of whether the death penalty system
produces an unconstitutionally arbitrary pattern of results. In
order to do this, the Court can consider the death penalty
system to be one national system and examine the pattern of
outcomes, rather than consider the system by jurisdiction and
examine only particular case outcomes. Both the one-nationalsystem and pattern-of-outcomes ideas deserve further
explanation.
As to the one-national-system aspect of the holding,
Furman was a case from Georgia, and it arrived with two
companion cases, one from Georgia and the other from Texas.24
The Court’s decision, though, was based on the Justices’
perceptions of how the death penalty system was operating
throughout all of the country’s death penalty jurisdictions, not
on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis. Justice White’s opinion
most clearly demonstrated the Court’s nationwide concern—his
22

Id. at 293-94 (Brennan, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-89 (1976) (“[W]here discretion
is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a
human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”).
24
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972). See also Jackson v.
Georgia, 171 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. 1969), rev’d, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (death sentence for
rape); Branch v. Texas, 447 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969), rev’d, 408 U.S. 238
(1972) (same).
23
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analysis was “based on 10 years of almost daily exposure to the
facts and circumstances of hundreds and hundreds of federal
and state criminal cases,”25 and this same perspective was
shared by the other majority Justices.26 Further, not only did
the Court’s language exhibit this nationwide perspective, so did
its behavior: the Court simultaneously entered death sentence
reversals in all of the more than one hundred cases on its
docket from death-sentencing jurisdictions across the country.27
As a result, all then-existing death penalty jurisdictions—not
just Georgia and Texas—immediately recognized that their
systems were invalid, both prospectively and retroactively.
As to the pattern-of-outcomes aspect of the Furman
holding, the Court implicitly realized that if it always focused
on a particular case, there would always be arguably valid
explanations for the result. Even in the pre-Furman era, it is
hard to imagine that prosecutors and sentencers believed they
were acting arbitrarily in any particular death-eligible case.
Accordingly, arbitrariness could only be identified through
patterns of results. This Article will refer to the one-nationalsystem/pattern-of-outcomes
approach
as
the
Furman
“nationwide outcomes” holding.
Since Furman, the Court has never re-employed the
nationwide outcomes holding; indeed, the Court has only rarely
decided cases that involved even a whole-state-system
perspective.28 Rather, as will be explained shortly, the Court’s
post-Furman capital jurisprudence has largely focused on
attempting to remedy over-inclusion on an issue-by-issue
basis.29 Yet the Court has never suggested that the nationwide
outcomes holding of Furman is no longer good law. Furman
should compel the Court at suitable intervals to step back,
25

Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
Id. See also id. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating death sentences
are much more likely to be imposed against a defendant who is “poor and despised, and
lacking in political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority,
[rather than] those who by social position may be in a more protected position.”).
Justice Douglas did not limit these remarks to the systems of Georgia and Texas that
presented the issue in Furman.
27
See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND
THE AMERICAN AGENDA 37 (1986).
28
The one major case calling on the Court to use a whole-state-system
perspective was McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 282-83 (1987). The defendant
presented statistical evidence of how Georgia’s system had operated over a large
number of cases over a several-year time span. Id. at 286. The Court declined to take
a whole-system perspective, instead concluding that arbitrariness had to be assessed
on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 319.
29
See infra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
26
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apply the nationwide outcomes approach, and determine
whether “tinker[ing] with the machinery of death”30 has
produced a system that delivers a non-arbitrary pattern of
outcomes. This Article will argue that the best available
evidence shows that arbitrariness still runs rampant more
than three decades after Furman.
This is an appropriate moment for the Court to apply a
renewed Furman analysis. Adjusted for increased national
population since 1972, the infrequency with which death
sentences have been handed down recently—an average of 152
per year for the last four years31—closely parallels the
infrequency with which death sentences were handed down in
the four years preceding Furman—an average of 103 per year.32
During the last four years the death sentence rate per 100,000

30

This memorable phrase was coined by Justice Blackmun in his late-career
jeremiad against capital punishment. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145
(1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
31
See THOMAS P. BONCZAR AND TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS BULL., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2004 14 (2005),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp04.pdf. The number of death sentences per year
since 1994 are as follows: 1994—314, 1995—317, 1996—317, 1997—277, 1998—300,
1999—276, 2000—232, 2001—163, 2002—168, 2003—152, 2004—125. The Bureau of
Justice Statistics (hereinafter “BJS”) figure of 125 death sentences in 2004 is lower
than the number found by this Article. The reason is that BJS researchers do not use
the “Death Row USA” reports to compile their figures. Rather, BJS sends out a once-ayear questionnaire to corrections departments and compiles the responses. Thus, the
BJS figures are subject to reporting oversights, and, in particular, are prone to missing
resentences. BJS compiles a list of names of the persons comprising its 125 death
sentences figure, but will not share this list with the public, including myself.
Telephone Interview with Tracy L. Snell, Statistician, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Bureau of
Just. Statistics (Nov. 30, 2005). Thus, it is impossible to compare the BJS list with my
list to see who is missing from the BJS list. It is clear, though, that the BJS list missed
several death sentences in 2004, because each of the death sentences found by this
Article are documented to have been imposed in 2004. Probably the BJS figures from
earlier years are consistently understated, as well. But even if they are understated by
fifteen or twenty sentences per year, the death sentence rate per 100,000 over the last
four years would not significantly increase above 0.053. Experts have assayed various
explanations for the decline since 2000. See, e.g., Mike Tolson, Fewer Killers Getting
Sentenced to Death, HOUSTON CHRON., May 22, 2005, at A1 (suggesting increased
availability of life-without-parole sentences, better trained and funded capital defense
lawyers, skittish juries due to publicized exonerations, reduced pool of death-eligible
defendants due to U. S. Supreme Court decisions, prosecutorial frustration with costs
and appellate reversals, and greater prosecutorial selectivity). Still, Richard Dieter of
the Death Penalty Information Center sums up the state of knowledge: “Something’s
been going on in the last four or five years, but it’s hard to say precisely what. . . . You
wouldn’t have thought a few years ago this is the way things were going to go.” Id.
32
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 291-92 n.41 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (listing the death sentences in the decade of 1961-1970 as follows: 1961—
140, 1962—103, 1963—93, 1964—106, 1965—86, 1966—118, 1967—85, 1968—102,
1969—97, 1970—127 (citation omitted)).
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population was 0.053; the rate in the four years before Furman
was a virtually indistinguishable 0.051. 33
B. Toward a Non-Arbitrary System?
1. Envisioning a Non-Arbitrary System
Despite the Court’s disapproval of the then-existing
death penalty system in Furman, and its voluminous capital
jurisprudence in the ensuing three-plus decades, the Court has
never specifically articulated its own vision of what a nonarbitrary death-sentencing system would look like. This is
understandable for at least two reasons. First, the Court is not
a legislature—it does not have the institutional authority to
specify a complete, best-practices death penalty system.
Rather, the Court normally responds to challenges regarding
particular aspects of particular death penalty schemes on an
issue-by-issue basis; that is, it does not opine concerning what
the best practice is, but only whether the challenged practice is
so bad as to be unconstitutional. Second, even if the Court had
felt institutionally competent to articulate a fully-developed
vision of a non-arbitrary system since Furman, such a
formulation would have been difficult because the Court has
been comprised of justices with widely divergent philosophies—
ranging from those who have thought any attempt by the Court
to regulate this area was unjustified,34 to others who have
believed capital punishment was inherently unconstitutional
and unsalvageable.35 Even a moderately coherent doctrine is a
lot to expect under these conditions.
33
The U.S. population in 1970 was about 203,302,000. See U.S. DEP’T OF
COM., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING tbl.2 (1993),
www.census.gov/prod/cen1990/cph2/cph-2-1-1.pdf. The U.S. population in 2004 was
about 293,655,404. See U.S. DEP’T OF COM., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATE AND
COUNTY QUICK FACTS, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited
Jan. 27, 2006).
34
These include current Justices Scalia and Thomas: “In my view, that line
of decisions [beginning in Furman] had no proper foundation in the Constitution.”
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 610 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring, Thomas, J., joining).
Also, Chief Justice Rehnquist: “[J]udicial self-restraint is surely an implied, if not an
expressed, condition of the grant of authority of judicial review. The Court’s holding in
these cases has been reached, I believe, in complete disregard of that implied
condition.” Furman, 408 U.S. at 470 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). And, Chief Justice
Burger, Justice Powell, and Justice Blackmun were skeptical of the legitimacy of the
Court’s efforts to regulate capital punishment. See id. at 375-76 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 418 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 408-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
35
These included Justices Brennan and Marshall, who wrote in every one of
their capital punishment opinions that they would find the penalty inherently
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Yet a vision of a non-arbitrary system is imperative.
How can the arbitrariness of the system be assessed without an
aspirational standard with which to compare it? This Article
asks the following question: Does the system sentence to death
only, and a robust proportion of, the “worst of the worst” in a
fairly calibrated way; and when it excludes the “worst of the
worst,” does it do so for valid, merits-related reasons?36 This
question can be broken down into a litmus test that consists of
four sub-questions:
1. Are all insufficiently aggravated criminals—those
who are not the “worst of the worst”—excluded from
death sentences?
2. Is the death-sentencing rate robust among those who
are arguably the “worst of the worst”? As will be
explained later, this Article will consider a 33 1/3%
death-sentencing rate among the “worst of the worst”
to be the minimum acceptable rate.37
3. Does the death-sentencing rate increase as the level
of aggravation increases?
4. When those who are arguably among the “worst of
the worst” do not receive death sentences, are the
reasons rationally related to the merits of the cases?

unconstitutional. See Michael Mello, Adhering to Our Views: Justices Brennan and
Marshall and the Relentless Dissent to Death as a Punishment, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
591, 593 (1995). Justice Douglas was probably in this category. And Justice Blackmun
became a convert toward the end of his tenure on the Court: “From this day forward, I
no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death. . . . I feel morally and intellectually
obligated simply to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed.” Callins v.
Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
36
Some supporters of capital punishment contend that the only relevant
question is the first one, namely, does the system sentence to death only the “worst of
the worst”? These supporters believe that if a particular defendant is worthy of death,
the fact that others who are death-worthy escape death sentences cannot make that
particular defendant’s death sentence unjust. See, e.g., Ernest van den Haag, The
Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1662 (1986) (“If capital
punishment is immoral in se, no distribution of it among the guilty could make it
moral. If capital punishment is moral, no distribution would make it immoral.”). For
most people, however, the idea that the distribution of punishment has no comparative
or procedural aspects is disproven by a thought experiment involving a death penalty
lottery: imagining the names of all death-worthy defendants for the year inscribed on
lottery balls, placed in a lottery hopper, and a specified percentage drawn at random
receive death sentences, while the others receive non-death sentences.
37
See infra p. 819.
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Not only does this test comport with common sense, it is
also consistent with the most important themes of Supreme
Court death penalty jurisprudence. First, it is consistent with
Furman: a system that met this litmus test would not employ
unlimited discretion to impose death on a “capriciously selected
random handful,”38 nor would it impose death “with great
infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes [with] no
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is
imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”39
Second, this litmus test is consistent with the Court’s
emphasis that death sentences must be proportionate to the
offense.40 This sensitivity to scale is apparent in the Court’s
unequivocal requirement that death sentences only be imposed
for offenses including at least one murder. The litmus test
takes proportionality into account in several ways, most
fundamentally through its requirements that death only be
imposed upon the “worst of the worst” and be positively
correlated to aggravation.
Third, it is consistent with the principle that death
sentences must be “reliable.” The Court has stated that death
sentences must be “reliable,”41 but has never comprehensively
defined what reliability means in this context. It surely means
at least two things, though: that the punishment of death is
only proportionate to the worst crimes;42 and that a death
sentence is not reliable unless the defendant has been afforded
the opportunity to present mitigating evidence.43 As was
mentioned just above, the litmus test takes the degree of
aggravation into account. Further, the litmus test takes
38

Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
40
See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (finding death is
disproportionate penalty for rape of adult woman); Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917,
917 (1977) (holding death is disproportionate penalty for kidnapping and rape and
citing to facts in state court opinion, Eberheart v. State, 232 Ga. 247 (1974)); Hooks v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 917, 917 (1977) (holding death is disproportionate penalty for rape
and citing to facts in state court opinion, Hooks v. State, 233 Ga. 149 (1974)).
41
See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (holding there is
particularly strong constitutional interest “in the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case”); see also
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 169 (1994) (holding due process interest in
reliability requires defendant to be able to inform sentencer of parole ineligibility when
prosecution contends defendant will constitute future threat).
42
See supra note 40.
43
See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (establishing principle that constitutionally
acceptable death penalty system must provide defendant with opportunity to present
mitigating evidence concerning character, record, or circumstances of offense); see also
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 606 (1978) (reaffirming Woodson principle).
39
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mitigation into account in sub-question one—an inquiry into
whether the defendant is one of the “worst of the worst” entails
a consideration of mitigating evidence.
Finally, it is consistent with the principle that there are
constitutionally impermissible non-merits-based reasons for
imposing or not imposing death sentences.44 Sub-question four
of the litmus test explicitly inquires whether the imposition or
non-imposition of death sentences rests on proper merits-based
reasons concerning the aggravation levels of the crimes and the
defendants, or instead on improper factors such as
prosecutorial budgets, wishes of the victims’ relatives, and
perceived appellate hostility to death sentences.
While this litmus test is consistent with the themes of
the Court’s capital jurisprudence, there are crucial ways in
which the Court’s issue-by-issue case holdings do not
consistently require a non-arbitrary system, and in key
respects, affirmatively undermine non-arbitrariness. It is
necessary to examine the Court’s precedents as to each of the
litmus test’s four sub-questions in order to see how these
holdings have contributed to the maintenance of an arbitrary
system.
2. Does the Court’s Capital Jurisprudence Conduce to a
Non-Arbitrary System?
In the following four subsections, this Article will
examine whether the Court’s capital jurisprudence conduces to
or cuts against the four parts of the litmus test for a nonarbitrary system.

44

See, e.g., Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36 (1986) (holding that race is
impermissible consideration in death sentencing). Presumably, at least two other
bases that are impermissible in jury selection in all cases—including capital cases—are
impermissible death-sentencing factors: gender (see J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 511
U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (prohibiting exercise of peremptory challenges based on gender)),
and ethnicity (see Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371 (1991) (prohibiting
exercise of peremptory challenges based on ethnicity)). Also, it is impermissible for a
sentencer to be influenced by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion,
prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 54243 (1987) (upholding jury instruction so worded, characterizing it as “a catalog of the
kind of factors that could improperly influence a juror’s decision to vote for or against
the death penalty”).
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a. Does the Court’s Doctrine Assure that All
Insufficiently Aggravated Criminals Are
Excluded from Death Sentences?
Assuring that insufficiently aggravated criminals are
not sentenced to death has been the most consistent force
animating the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence. Most of
the Court’s key precedents bear directly on this goal. The
Court has sought to achieve the goal of minimizing overinclusion45 in several ways, five of which are listed below.
First, the Court has sought to decrease the likelihood
that sentencers will tend toward over-inclusion. The Court has
required a special process designed to focus the sentencer on
the monumental nature of the death-sentencing decision—the
bifurcated trial with its separated guilt/innocence and penalty
phases is now standard.46 Additionally, sentencers cannot be
otherwise deflected from believing they bear full responsibility
for the weighty decision to impose death.47
Second, the Court has limited the universe of deatheligible crimes in order to minimize over-inclusion. At first cut,
that universe is limited to one: murder.48 Beyond that, the
doctrine makes clear that not all murders are death-eligible;
instead, the definitions “genuinely narrow the class of persons
eligible for the death penalty”49 in such a manner as to
45
For an extensive discussion of over-inclusion, see Carol S. Steiker &
Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts:
Reflections on Two Decades of
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 366-69 (1995)
(identifying minimizing over-inclusion as one of Court’s four goals). See also David
McCord, Judging the Effectiveness of the Supreme Court’s Death Penalty Jurisprudence
According to the Court’s Own Goals: Mild Success or Major Disaster? 24 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 545, 573-75 (1997) (arguing minimizing over-inclusion has been Court’s primary
goal).
46
Technically, the Court has never opined that this is the only system that is
constitutionally acceptable, but after the Court approved three such systems in its first
post-Furman death penalty pronouncements in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195
(1976); Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 248 (1976); and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,
276 (1976), no jurisdiction has experimented with any other set-up.
47
See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985) (holding
unconstitutional jury instructions that could lead jurors to believe propriety of death
sentence is determined not by jury, but by appellate court).
48
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 303-06 (1987). There is, however,
still a possibility that sexual assault of a child may be a death-eligible offense. See
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (stating a death sentence is disproportionate
to rape of “an adult woman”). Further, treason could possibly support a death
sentence. See George P. Fletcher, Ambivalence About Treason, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1611,
1612 (2004) (“Treason still carries the death penalty, but that sanction is of dubious
constitutionality.”).
49
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877-78 (1983).
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“reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe [i.e., death]
sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of
murder.”50 This is typically accomplished through the
requirement of “aggravating circumstances.”51
Third, the Court has minimized over-inclusion by
requiring that potential jurors who are overly zealous
proponents of the death penalty not be allowed to serve.52
Fourth, the Court has minimized over-inclusion by
identifying classes of offenders who are insufficiently
aggravated murderers as a matter of law: those who are too
young53 or too mentally compromised54 to be morally responsible
enough to warrant execution cannot be sentenced to death.
Finally, the Court has minimized sentencers’ tendency
toward over-inclusion by requiring individualized sentencing.
Mandatory death sentences are impermissible for any kind of
murder.55 Rather, each defendant must have the opportunity to
show that he56 is actually not among the “worst of the worst”

50

Id.; see also Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994) (narrowing
“must apply only to a subclass of defendants convicted of murder”).
51
Alternatively called “special circumstances” in some jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1999 & Supp. 2005). Also, some jurisdictions perform
the narrowing by defining only certain categories of murder as death-eligible, rather
than defining murder rather broadly and then making death-eligibility turn on
whether aggravating or special circumstances exist. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Art.
19.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) (defining nine kinds of “capital murder”).
52
See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992) (“A juror who will
automatically vote for the death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider
the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require
him to do.”). The acceptable capital juror is one whose views would not “prevent or
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his
instructions and his oath.” Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985).
53
See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (finding it unconstitutional
to sentence to death offender who was less than eighteen years old at time of murder).
54
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) (holding it
unconstitutional to sentence to death offenders who were mentally retarded at time of
murder); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 407-08 (1986) (holding it unconstitutional
to execute an inmate who is insane at time of proposed execution).
55
See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) and Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976) (establishing this principle); see also Sumner v.
Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 78 (1987) (holding unconstitutional a mandatory death sentence
for a category of offender some believed might be an exception to the rule: an offender
who committed a murder while under a sentence of life without parole).
56
I choose to use the male-gendered pronouns because capital murder is such
a male-dominated activity. For example, only five of the death sentences in 2004 were
imposed on women. See App. D, DS 31, 50, 99, 106, 124. Only five of the defendants
spared by sentencers in 2004 were women. See App. E, SS 15, 28, 32, 83, 111. The
highest depravity point score for a woman was 23 (PS 17), a score that was exceeded by
thirty-nine men and equaled by four other men.
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because of mitigating factors relating to the defendant’s
“character, record, or the circumstances of the offense.”57
Despite these five doctrines designed to decrease overinclusion, the Court’s record regarding minimizing overinclusion is actually quite spotty. The Court has established at
least eight lines of authority that undermine the goal of
minimizing over-inclusion.
First, the Court failed to act upon compelling evidence
that many defendants were over-included due to racial bias.58
Second, the Court failed to require that death penalty
defense counsel meet any higher standard of effective
assistance of counsel than defense lawyers in other cases,59
ignoring the obvious fact that one of the major causes of overinclusion is ineffective lawyering in the very arcane arena of
death penalty litigation.60
Third, the Court failed to require any clear guidance to
sentencers about how to decide whether to impose a death
sentence,61 thereby raising the specter of over-inclusion (as well
as arbitrary under-inclusion).
57

See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1149-50 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,

dissenting).
58
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987) (finding that a huge,
unimpeached statistical study showing victim’s being white substantially increased
odds of death sentence, all other things being equal (particularly if defendant was
black), was insufficient to establish equal protection or cruel and unusual punishment
violation). Research on racial bias has continued to find disparities that seem to be
race-based. See, e.g., Regina Brett, Death penalty not colorblind, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), May 15, 2005, at B1 (summarizing a massive Associated Press study of
almost 2,000 murder indictments in Ohio from 1981-2002 as follows: “Kill a white
person, and you’re twice as likely to end up on death row as you are if you kill a black
person.”).
59
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 668-69 (1984) (establishing
two-prong test applicable to all criminal cases, including death penalty cases, under
which defendant must prove: (1) lack of reasonably effective assistance; and (2)
reasonable probability that effective assistance would have resulted in a more
defendant-favorable outcome).
60
See,
e.g.,
Liebman
et
al.,
supra
note
13,
at
www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/sectionVIII.html (“Egregiously incompetent
lawyering . . . is responsible for about 40% of reversals at the state post-conviction
phase of capital review and between a quarter and a third of the reversals at the
federal habeas stage.”).
For more on the prevalence of ineffective assistance in capital cases, see
Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime
but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L. J. 1835 (1994). As to ineffective assistance
generally, see William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn: Doctrinal and
Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91 (1996).
61
See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1001 (1983) (noting that, with few
specified exceptions, “the Court has deferred to the State’s choice of substantive factors
relevant to the penalty determination”). Not only has the Court deferred on the
substantive factors, it has also largely deferred on what procedure the sentencer can
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Fourth, the Court has never undertaken a quantitative
analysis to check whether the long lists of aggravators
generated by most legislatures in fact render too great a
percentage of murderers death-eligible.62
Fifth, the Court has only considered whether a specified
aggravator is qualitatively bad enough to support death
sentences in two contexts. The Court has struggled with the
ubiquitous “heinous, atrocious, and cruel” aggravator and its
variants,63 hardly requiring its over-inclusive potential to be
narrowed much. The Court has also weighed in on the culpable
mental state required of felony-murderers,64 again with a result
that is only partially designed to minimize over-inclusion.

use in reaching the death or non-death decision. Most notably, the Court approved the
Georgia scheme in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 201 (1976), a scheme that left the
jury entirely to its own devices in making that determination once it found an
aggravating circumstance.
On the other hand, the Court also approved the
Pennsylvania scheme that required imposition of a death sentence when at least one
aggravator was found, but no mitigators. See Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299,
301 (1990). The Court’s only real regulation of the death-sentencing decisional process
is that it is unconstitutional to require jurors to unanimously agree that evidence is
mitigating before the jurors are authorized to consider it in determining the sentence.
See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 442-43 (1990).
62
For example, detailed research on California first-degree murder cases for
the five-year period 1988-1992 found that eighty-seven percent of defendants were
death-eligible under a scheme with thirty-two death-qualifying “special circumstances.”
Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for
Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1327, 1331 (1997); see also DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL.,
EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 268 n.31
(1990) (finding eighty-six percent of murder cases death-eligible under Georgia law).
63
Such verbal formulations are unconstitutionally vague without a
narrowing interpretation being imparted to the jury. See Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S.
463, 471-72 (1993) (holding aggravating circumstance of killing with “utter disregard
for human life” sufficiently narrowed by construction of “killer who kills without feeling
or sympathy”); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654-55 (1990) (finding “especially
heinous, cruel or depraved” aggravating circumstance sufficiently narrowed by
construction that murderer “relishes the murder, evidencing debasement or
perversion,” or “shows an indifference to the suffering of the victim and evidences a
sense of pleasure in killing” (internal citation and quotations omitted)); Proffit v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255 (1976) (finding “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel”
aggravating circumstance sufficiently narrowed by construction of “the conscienceless
or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim” (internal citation and
quotations omitted)). The Court could, instead, have required legislatures to specify
more narrow, objective aggravators.
64
See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (holding major participation
in dangerous felony combined with reckless indifference to human life sufficient for
death-eligibility). Instead, the Court could have required that the defendant either did
the killing, intended for another cohort to kill, or knew well in advance that another
cohort planned to kill. See David McCord, State Death Sentencing for Felony Murder
Accomplices Under the Enmund and Tison Standards, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 843, 884 (2000).
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Sixth, the Court has permitted death-eligibility criteria
to duplicate aggravating circumstances,65 thereby perhaps
inducing the sentencer to over-include defendants for death
sentences by counting an aggravating factor twice when it
should only be counted once.
Seventh, the Court has approved death-sentencing
schemes (few in number, but mighty in importance because
they include Texas and Virginia)66 in which mitigating evidence
can only be considered by the sentencer in an artificial manner
that may constrict the ability to give the evidence its full
mitigating weight.67
Finally, the Court has failed to require appellate courts
to engage in proportionality review to identify defendants who
are comparatively over-included.68
As demonstrated above, the Court has repeatedly
emphasized the importance of a non-arbitrary system in the
years since Furman; nonetheless, many of its specific holdings
have actually cut against these themes and conduced to the
creation and maintenance of a system that does not exclude
insufficiently aggravated offenders. The bottom line is this: the
Court’s jurisprudence incompletely and haphazardly seeks to

65
See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 (1988) (holding acceptable that
statute defining a category of death-eligible murder as “a specific intent to kill or inflict
great bodily harm upon more than one person” virtually duplicated that language as
aggravating circumstance in death-worthiness determination).
66
Texas is far and away the leader in executions in the post-Furman era with
336 as of Jan. 1, 2005. Virginia ranks second with ninety-four. See CRIM. JUST.
PROJECT OF THE NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, INC., DEATH ROW U.S.A.
WINTER
2005
9-10
(2005),
www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/pubs/drusa/
DRUSA_Winter_2005.pdf. The statutes of both Texas and Virginia (as well as Oregon)
define a few relatively narrow categories of death-eligible murders, but then make the
death-sentencing determination hinge not on aggravating circumstances, but rather
largely on a determination of the defendant’s future threat of violence. See OR. REV.
STAT. § 163.150(1)(b)(B) (2003) (jury must decide “[w]hether there is a probability that
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society”); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(2)(b)(1)
(Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) (identical language); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (2004)
(identical language except with “serious” inserted before “threat”).
67
The Court has held that evidence of the defendant’s youthful age can be
given full mitigating effect even though the jury’s consideration of it is strictly
channeled through the future dangerousness inquiry. See Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S.
350, 368 (1993). Prior to the ruling in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002), that
mentally retarded persons are not death-eligible, even mental retardation could be
primarily funneled through the future dangerousness inquiry. See Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 322 (1989).
68
See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 44-47 (1984) (rejecting contention that
appellate proportionality review is required for constitutionality of death-sentencing
system).

816

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:2

assure that only the “worst of the worst” are subject to death
sentences.
b. Does the Court’s Doctrine Assure that a Robust
Proportion of the “Worst of the Worst”
Criminals Will be Sentenced to Death?
It is controversial to assert that sentencing a robust
proportion of the “worst of the worst” defendants to death is
more desirable than sentencing an anemic proportion to
death.69 The argument from the traditional criminal law
perspective for a robust rate is straightforward and powerful: a
robust rate is necessary for retributive, denunciatory, and
general deterrent efficacy. The three identifiable arguments
for an anemic rate are not persuasive.
The first argument for an anemic rate is that it is
impossible to determine the “worst of the worst” defendants. It
looks only at the crimes and the past criminal history of
defendants, that is, at aggravation, and asserts that it is
This
impossible to describe the “worst of the worst.”70
argument is fallacious because it is quite possible to rank the
aggravation level; while the cut-off between the “worst of the
worst” and the “very bad” is gray, most cases fall outside the
gray area.71
The second argument against a robust rate is a slightly
scaled-back version of the first: the “worst of the worst”
category is actually much smaller than it appears at first blush
because the proportion of persons committing highly
aggravated crimes who are morally blameworthy enough to be
executed is very small due to the prevalence of wretched
69
The abolitionist position that no proportion should be death-sentenced is
beside the point because the issue is whether the death penalty system is working nonarbitrarily in thirty-eight states and in the federal system. In the interest of
disclosure, the reader should know that the author subscribes to this position, but has
set it aside for purposes of this Article. The non-death penalty states form two clusters
and three individual states. The New England cluster includes Maine, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, and Vermont. The upper Midwest cluster includes Iowa, Michigan,
Minnesota, North Dakota, and Wisconsin. The three other states are Alaska, Hawaii,
and West Virginia.
70
A well-known statement of this position comes from McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971): “To identify before the fact those characteristics
of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to
express these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and applied
by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present human
ability.” Id.
71
See infra pp. 833-840, and Chart 1 on p. 847.
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upbringings, mental illness or retardation, drug or alcohol
impairment, or similar mitigating circumstances or conditions
Essentially, this argument is that
among this group.72
mitigation will trump aggravation most of the time, no matter
how aggravated the crimes. How persuasive this is depends on
how committed one is to a belief in free will. After subtracting
out young and mentally retarded offenders—as the Court has
correctly done73—the argument for free will/just deserts has
seemed compelling to the American public, as the widespread
and tenacious existence of capital punishment demonstrates.
Thus, this second argument against a robust death-sentencing
rate is actually a thinly disguised abolition argument that does
not effectively demonstrate any advantages of an anemic over a
robust rate.
The third argument for an anemic death-sentencing
rate among the “worst of the worst” was articulated more than
twenty years ago by Professor Robert Weisberg:
There may never be a social consensus on the role of capital
punishment, but a social engineer might try to identify a sort of
culturally optimal number of executions that would best compromise
among the competing demands made by the different constituencies
of the criminal justice system.
The most obvious approach is to have some executions, but not very
many. A small number of executions offers a logical, if crude,
compromise between the extreme groups who want either no
executions or as many as possible. It would also satisfy those who
believe that execution is appropriate only for a small number of
especially blameworthy killers, at least if the right ones are selected.
It might further satisfy those who do not believe there is a
discernible and small category of most blameworthy killers, but who
believe that a small number of executions might adequately serve
general deterrence and make a necessary political statement about
society’s attitude toward crime. But our hypothetical social engineer
would want to consider other points of view or factors as well in
designing his culturally optimal number. Too many executions
would inure the populace to the fact of state killing and thereby
deprive the death penalty of its value as a social symbol. Or too
many executions might have the opposite effect of morally offending
people with the spectacle of a bloodbath. On the other hand, if the
number were too low in comparison with the number of murders,

72
See, e.g., Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder: Social
Histories and the Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 608 (1995) (“These,
then, are some of the elements of the social histories that produce capital violence:
Family poverty and deprivation, childhood neglect, emotional and physical abuse,
institutional failure and mistreatment in the juvenile and adult correctional system.”).
73
See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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capital punishment might not serve general deterrence. Or if we
execute too few people, we may not produce a big enough statistical
sample to prove that the death penalty meets any tests of rationality
or nondiscrimination. . . .
Viewing the statistics of the last decade, one might imagine that in a
rough, systemic way, judges have indeed manipulated death penalty
doctrine to achieve a culturally optimal number of executions. That
number is very close to zero, but it must be viewed in light of a very
different number—the number of death sentences.
If we somewhat fancifully treat the judiciary as a single and
calculating mind, we could say that it has conceived a fiendishly
clever way of satisfying the competing demands on the death
penalty: We will sentence vast numbers of murderers to death, but
execute virtually none of them.74

Twenty-plus years after this excerpt was penned, it only
needs slight amendment—vast numbers of murderers are not
sentenced to death, but the turtle’s pace of executions has
caused a vast pile-up on death row (more than 3400 at last
count).75
Professor Weisberg’s reasoning may more closely
approximate the Court’s actual agenda than this Article’s
assertion that the Court has pursued a non-arbitrary system.
Since several Justices were abolitionists, and “some, if not
most, of the Justices of the Supreme Court—past and present—
are or have been ambivalent about capital punishment, at least
when confronted with actual death row inmates in real cases,”76
the Court’s actual goal may simply have been to create a strict
filtration system that permits only a few cases to make it to
execution (the system would be even stricter if the more
conservative Justices were not able to regularly muster a
majority). Under this view, the Court has not sought to
achieve a system that selects a robust proportion of the “worst
of the worst” in increasing ratio as the level of aggravation
rises, but rather to achieve a system in which the smallest
possible number of the “worst of the worst” are executed
without the Court having to stick its neck out by ruling capital
punishment irreparably unconstitutional. But one hopes the
Court has been acting in a more principled fashion. All in all,
74

Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305, 386-87.
To be exact, 3455, according to the CRIM. JUST. PROJECT OF THE NAACP
LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, INC., DEATH ROW U.S.A. WINTER 2005 1 (2005),
www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/pubs/drusa/DRUSA_Winter_2005.pdf.
76
Stephen R. McAllister, The Problem of Implementing a Constitutional
System of Capital Punishment, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 1039, 1064 (1995).
75
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arguments that only an anemic proportion of the “worst of the
worst” should be sentenced to death are unpersuasive.
The Furman Court seemed committed to the proposition
that one of the hallmarks of a non-arbitrary system would be
that it imposed death sentences on a robust proportion of those
who were eligible:
In Furman, the Justices’ conclusion that the death penalty was
imposed only infrequently derived from their understanding that
only 15-20% of convicted murderers who were death-eligible were
being sentenced to death. . . . In Gregg, the plurality reiterated this
understanding. . . . While the Court did not indicate in Furman and
Gregg what death sentence ratio (actual death sentences per
convicted death-eligible murderers) a state scheme would have to
produce to satisfy Furman, plainly any scheme producing a ratio of
less than 20% would not.77

If 20% was deemed woefully inadequate by the Court, this
Article will assume that a ratio would need to be at least onethird—33 1/3%—to withstand constitutional scrutiny under
Furman. This figure is significantly greater than 20%, yet still
leaves the system a large margin for mercy and imperfect
operation.
The Court’s emphasis in Furman on a robust deathsentencing ratio was very prominent.78 Despite this supportive
beginning for a robust ratio, four years later Gregg made it
apparent that the Court’s concern for a robust ratio had been
misread. There are two decision-makers who can influence the
death penalty ratio among the “worst of the worst”:
prosecutors, who can exclude defendants from death-eligibility;
and sentencers, who can exclude defendants from deathworthiness. The Furman Court focused on the ratio of death
sentences among convicted murderers who were death-eligible,
thereby possibly indicating that the Court was concerned with
arbitrariness among both prosecutors and sentencers.79 The
77

Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 62, at 1288-89 (1997).
Indeed, it was so prominent that some states were convinced that it was
the Court’s primary concern, and redrafted their statutes to make death sentences
mandatory within the death-eligible groups—only to have those statutes struck down
for failing to anticipate the individualized sentencing principle. See Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976) (striking down mandatory death-sentencing
scheme); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1976) (doing the same).
79
See Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 62, at 1288:
78

In Furman, the Justices’ conclusion that the death penalty was imposed only
infrequently derived from their understanding that only 15-20% of convicted
murderers who were death-eligible were being sentenced to death. Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the four dissenters, adopted that statistic, citing
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Court in Gregg, however, flatly rejected the idea that any
constitutional oversight was due prosecutorial decisions
regarding whether to pursue death sentences: “The existence of
[this] discretionary [stage of prosecutorial decision-making] is
not determinative of the issues before us. . . . Nothing in any of
our cases suggests that the decision to afford an individual
defendant mercy violates the Constitution.”80 This holding is
short-sighted in two respects: 1) “mercy” is not the only reason
that prosecutors could decide not to pursue death sentences—
other less noble reasons are not hard to imagine; and 2) as
noble as the idea of “mercy” sounds, if it is dispensed on the
basis of nothing more than sympathy, or illicit concerns like
race, “mercy” is itself arbitrary. The Court nonetheless wrote
an admiring testimonial to prosecutorial discretion a decade
later,81 and has not revisited the issue. The Court’s refusal to
oversee prosecutorial decision-making is a heavy blow to robust
death sentence ratios because significantly more defendants
are shielded from death sentences by prosecutorial decisions
than by sentencer decisions.82 Thus, prosecutorial decisionmaking has always been, and remains today, the unopened
black box of possible death-sentencing arbitrariness.
Even as to sentencer discretion, the Court’s concern was
short-lived. Post-Gregg the Court has never entertained a
challenge to a death-sentencing system based on an
insufficiently
robust
death-sentencing
ratio,
despite

to four sources. Justice Stewart, in turn, cited to the Chief Justice’s
statement as support for his conclusion that the imposition of death was
“unusual.”
Id. Since the decisions of prosecutors not to seek death sentences for death-eligible
convicted murderers is one of the two factors—together with sentencer decisions not to
impose death sentences—affecting this ratio, there was reason to believe the Court was
concerned with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
80
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976).
81
See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311-12 (1987) (citations omitted):
Discretion in the criminal justice system offers substantial benefits to a
criminal defendant. . . . As we have noted, a prosecutor can decline to charge,
offer a plea bargain, or decline to seek a death sentence in any particular
case. Of course, “the power to be lenient [also] is the power to discriminate,”
but a capital punishment system that did not allow for discretionary acts of
leniency “would be totally alien to our notions of criminal justice.”
Id.
82
See App. E (120 defendants spared by sentencers); App. F (323 defendants
spared by prosecutors).
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opportunities to do so.83 In fact, the Court struck a blow
against the possibility of a robust death-sentencing ratio when
it ruled that each juror is free to come to that juror’s own
conclusion that evidence is mitigating, without convincing any
other juror to accept this way of thinking.84 The Court’s failure
to enforce a robust death-sentencing rate means that more of
the “worst of the worst” will escape death sentences, which
adds to the arbitrariness of the system.
c. Does the Court’s Doctrine Consider Whether
the Death Sentence Rate Increases with the
Aggravation Level?
The Court has never considered whether the death
sentence ratio increases with aggravation level. One of the
best possible indicators that the system is fairly calibrated and
non-arbitrary, however, would be that the more aggravated a
criminal, the more likely that criminal is to receive a death
sentence. (This assumes that mitigation does not tend to
increase along with aggravation, a proposition that will be
established later.85) Thus, while there should be a robust
death-sentencing ratio for all sufficiently aggravated criminals,
one would expect that ratio to increase with the aggravation
level in a fairly calibrated system. The Court’s failure to
articulate this ideal allows legislatures and lower courts to
avoid shaping systems to reflect this feature of a non-arbitrary
system and thereby adds further to the system’s arbitrariness
nationwide.
83
See Shatz & Rivkind, supra note 62, at 1296-99 (noting that no
quantitative narrowing challenges have reached the Court). Certiorari was sought and
denied in at least one case, litigated by Professor Rivkind herself. See People v.
Sanchez, 906 P.2d 1129 (Cal. 1995), cert. denied, Sanchez v. California, 519 U.S. 835
(1996). Of course, it goes against the grain of capital defense lawyers to argue that the
system is unconstitutional because too few death sentences are being imposed.
Occasionally, though, a lawyer overcomes this mental hurdle. See, e.g., Lynne Tuohy,
Some Heinous Killers Given Life Sentences, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 16, 2005, at A1
(lawyer for condemned killer argued in a 142-page brief that the client was arbitrarily
selected for death in view of the fact that so many other heinous killers had received
life sentences).
84
The Court’s doctrine is narrower than this, holding only that it is
unconstitutional for a death-sentencing scheme to require the jurors to unanimously
find evidence to be mitigating before it can be considered in the sentencing balance.
See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 443-44 (1990); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S.
367, 384 (1988). But extant death-sentencing schemes do not require any sort of
concurrence among jurors concerning whether evidence is mitigating, effectively
leaving each juror to decide this individually.
85
See infra p. 841-42.
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d. Does The Court’s Doctrine Assure that When
the “Worst of the Worst” Are Spared Death
Sentences, It Is for Valid, Merits-Based
Reasons?
The only non-arbitrary reason for sparing an offender
arguably within the “worst of the worst” category is that he is
not provably one of the “worst of the worst.” There will often be
close issues about whether a defendant belongs in that
category, and sparing the defendant is appropriate when the
decision-maker’s best analysis, based on the merits of the case,
is that the defendant is not one of the “worst of the worst.” The
key, however, is that to be non-arbitrary such a decision must
be based on the merits of the case, either in terms of the ability
to prove the case, or of the weight of the aggravators against
the mitigators. The decision should not be based on extraneous
factors such as prosecutorial budgets, wishes of the victim’s
survivors, or a whole host of other possible factors discussed in
more detail later.86 Because the Court has declined to oversee
prosecutorial death sentence decision-making, or to put many
constraints on sentencer decision-making, the possibility of
arbitrariness is very real.
3. Additional Structural Factors Conducing to
Arbitrariness
In addition to the Court’s fragmented doctrine, there are
four additional structural factors, not of the Court’s making,
built into the death penalty system that conduce to
arbitrariness.
First, local county-level prosecutorial decision-making
authority concerning whether to pursue death sentences
contributes to arbitrariness. In only two jurisdictions does an
official with jurisdiction-wide authority make death penalty
decisions: Delaware,87 which gives the power to the Delaware
86
See infra pp. 856-863. Race, of course, looms large as an issue in capital
punishment. Unfortunately, no analysis based on either race-of-defendant or race-ofvictim, or interaction of the two, is possible from these data. The only racial data
known is the race-of-defendant information from the NAACP “Death Row USA”
reports, see http://www.naacpldf.org (follow “Publications” hyperlink; then follow
“Death Row USA” hyperlink); infra text at page 826, for the defendants in Appendix D
who were sentenced to death. The race-of-defendant information is not available for
the defendants who were spared by sentencers or by prosecutors in Appendices E and
F. Race-of-victim information is not available for any of the three sets of defendants.
87
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 29-2504(6) (Michie 2003).
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Attorney General, and the federal system, which gives the
power to the U.S. Attorney General.88 Obviously, dispersed
decision-making authority leads to wide disparities in decisions
about whether to seek death sentences in similar cases. These
disparities are exacerbated by the fact that funding of
prosecutors’ offices is also largely at the county level, which
puts severe constraints on some counties’ abilities to fund
expensive death prosecutions.89 Likewise, funding for indigent
defense in death cases is also often at the county level, again
causing financial implications to loom large, or defenses to be
under-funded.
Second, lack of any legislative regulation of the power of
local prosecutors to pursue or not pursue death penalty
sentences is problematic. When prosecutors have unfettered
discretion to pursue death sentences, one would expect some
death sentences to be pursued when death is not warranted,
and some not to be pursued when death is warranted. Just as
there are no judicial constraints on prosecutors’ powers, there
are likewise no legislative constraints. The Indiana House of
Representatives recently made news by proposing such a
constraint—a bill mandating that county prosecutors seek a
death
sentence
for
child
murderers
under
some
circumstances—and predictably, prosecutors have objected.90
The requirement of a unanimous jury verdict for a death
sentence also conduces to arbitrariness of the current system.
Of the thirty-nine death penalty jurisdictions (thirty-eight
states and the federal government), all but five rely on juries to
determine death sentences.91 All jury-sentencing jurisdictions
88

See UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUST., THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM:
A
STATISTICAL
SURVEY
(1988-2000)
2
(2000),
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag
/pubdoc/_dp_survey_final.pdf (explaining the procedure under a 1995 protocol requiring
U.S. Attorneys to bring a death-eligible case for review by the Attorney General’s Office
to determine whether a death sentence should be sought).
89
See infra notes 189-190 and accompanying text for further discussion.
90
See Niki Kelly, General Assembly: Death for Killers of Children? Measure
Passes House, but Prosecutors Object, J. GAZETTE, Feb. 18, 2005, at 1 (explaining bill
and prosecutors’ objections to it).
91
The Court in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 608 n.6 (2002), identified the
sentencers in the thirty-eight death penalty states as follows: twenty-nine used jury
sentencing; four used systems in which the jury rendered an advisory verdict, with the
judge making the ultimate sentencing recommendation (Alabama, Delaware, Florida,
and Indiana); and five had systems in which both aggravating circumstance factfinding and death sentence decision-making was left to a judge (Arizona, Colorado
(three-judge panel), Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska). Id. Ring held the latter five
systems unconstitutional because they denied defendants the right to a jury trial on
the existence of aggravating circumstances, id. at 609, although apparently it is still
constitutional for a judge to make the sentencing decision after a jury has found
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require a unanimous jury verdict for death, and in most of
those jurisdictions a hung jury results in an automatic nondeath sentence with no opportunity for the prosecution to retry
the penalty phase.92 This puts veto power over a death
sentence in the hands of each individual member of the jury,
and hung juries are quite common in penalty phase decisions,
often with counts of eleven to one or ten to two for death.
Clearly, this allocation of power cannot be expected to produce
non-arbitrary results.
Finally, arbitrariness is further supported by the wildly
varying state appellate and federal habeas corpus93 reversal
rates of death sentences. Higher court94 reversals of death
sentences have a huge impact on death-sentencing rates
because usually when a death sentence is reversed, it is not reimposed.95 Further, the fear of reversal undoubtedly causes
many prosecutors to forego seeking death sentences in many
death-eligible cases. Reversal rates are high overall,96 but
manifest huge variations from state to state. 97 It seems that
aggravating circumstances. In the wake of Ring, Arizona, Colorado, and Idaho
switched to jury sentencing (as did Indiana), while Montana and Nebraska adhered to
judge sentencing, but only after a jury has found aggravating circumstance(s).
Alabama, Delaware, and Florida adhered to their systems of a jury recommendation of
sentence, followed by a judge’s sentencing decision. Thus, Alabama, Delaware, Florida,
Montana, and Nebraska are the five states that do not rely on jury sentencing. See
Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury, 2
OH. ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 148 (2004) (explaining how affected states changed capital
sentencing procedures in the wake of Ring).
92
Arizona, California, and Kentucky permit the retrial of a penalty phase
that ends in a hung jury. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703.01 (2005); CAL. PENAL CODE §
190.4(b) (West 1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (West 2004); Skaggs v.
Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 672, 681 (Ky. 1985) (interpreting statute to allow retrial of
penalty phase when first jury deadlocks).
93
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (providing for federal courts to entertain habeas
corpus applications from state prisoners who allege they are being held “in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”).
94
In this context, all federal habeas courts are considered “higher” than any
state court.
95
See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
96
An influential study found a sixty-eight percent death sentence reversal
rate for all death sentences issued from 1973-1995. See JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A
BROKEN SYSTEM:
ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-1995 1 (2000),
http://ccjr.policy.net/cjedfund/jpreport/liebapp7.pdf?PROACTIVE_ID=cececdcec8cac9cb
cbc5cecfcfcfc5cecec6cbc6cecccbcdc8c5cf. Two commentators have contended that the
reversal rate is lower, but even the lowest estimate is forty percent. See Barry Latzer
& James N.G. Cauthen, Another Recount: Appeals in Capital Cases, 35 PROSECUTOR
25, 26 (2001) (arguing that reversal rate is closer to forty-three percent); Joseph L.
Hoffman, The Harry Pratter Professorship Lecture: Violence and Truth, 76 IND. L. J.
934, 946 (2001) (suggesting true reversal rate is about forty percent).
97
See William S. Lofquist, Putting Them There, Keeping Them There, and
Killing Them: An Analysis of State-Level Variations in Death Penalty Intensity, 87
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some higher courts are so philosophically opposed to capital
punishment that virtually no capital appeal will be permitted
to pass appellate muster,98 while other appellate courts display
such a hands-off attitude that even egregious errors will not
constitute cause for reversal.99 Although it is hard to see how
either the Supreme Court or legislatures can remedy these
disparities, perhaps a more consistent pattern of results at the
trial level would result in greater appellate consistency.
This overview of the legal landscape created by the
Court’s capital jurisprudence and other systemic factors does
not give much cause for optimism that the factual evidence will
show the system to be operating non-arbitrarily. It is to that
factual evidence that we now turn our attention.
II. EVIDENCE OF ARBITRARINESS FROM POPULAR PRESS
REPORTS
A. Collecting the Data for 2004
Perhaps surprisingly, no mechanism exists—either
governmental or non-governmental—for collecting data on all
IOWA L. REV. 1505, 1513-20 (2002) (detailing extreme variations in state death
sentence reversal rates, with some states’ rates very high, others very low, and normal
reversal rates of 30-50%. For example, Mississippi’s reversal rate of 54.09% and North
Carolina’s of 53.12% stand in stark contrast to Texas’s 12.95% and Virginia’s 5.17%).
98
The Ninth Circuit is notorious for not upholding death sentences. See
Diane Gunnels-Rowley, Death Penalty Costs Too Great, 37 ARIZ. ATT’Y 9 (Jan. 2001):
I am a career prosecutor, but I am personally opposed to the death
penalty . . . because I believe it is too expensive to administer. Death penalty
cases receive the most stringent and far-reaching appellate review, and
appellate courts (especially the Ninth Circuit) strain at gnats and swallow
camels seeking reversible error in every death penalty case. And, of course,
what they so assiduously seek, they usually find. This process leads to
reversals, which leads to costly retrials and often reconvictions. . . . The
entire death penalty process consumes valuable judicial resources that, in my
opinion, would be better spent in making the entire criminal justice process
more efficient.
Id.
99
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is most often mentioned. See, e.g.,
Andrew Hammell, Effective Performance Guarantees for Capital State Post-Conviction
Counsel: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 347, 375 (2003) (“News
coverage of problems with capital habeas review in Texas . . . resulted in a torrent of
criticism of the Court of Criminal Appeals. . . . The Texas Lawyer published a lengthy
article detailing allegations of the Court of Criminal Appeals’s lax oversight of the list
of qualified habeas counsel.”); Adam Liptak & Ralph Blumenthal, Death Sentences in
Texas Cases Try Supreme Court’s Patience, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2004, at A1 (explaining
the U. S. Supreme Court’s battles to force the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to be
more receptive to claims of error in capital cases).
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death-eligible murders in the United States. To gain a
nationwide perspective on the operation of capital punishment,
one must piece together data from many sources. Set forth
below are the steps undertaken to compile as complete a
database as possible of death-eligible offenses with a sentence
outcome in 2004. Ultimately, primary reliance was placed on
news reports appearing in searchable online databases.
To begin, from the invaluable quarterly report “Death
Row USA” published by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, one
can identify with complete accuracy the defendants who were
sentenced to death in 2004.100 The “Death Row USA” reports
cover calendar-quarters of the year and are published two to
three months after that quarter has closed. These reports do
not explicitly attempt to identify defendants who have been
newly added to death row. To generate such a list one must
painstakingly compare the list from one quarter to the list from
the next quarter to see which of the approximately 3400 names
are new entries.101 The research for this Article compared the
last quarter 2003 report with the first quarter 2004, the first
quarter 2004 with the second quarter 2004, the second quarter
2004 with the third quarter 2004, and the third quarter 2004
with the fourth quarter 2004. These comparisons revealed 142
defendants who were sentenced to death in calendar year 2004.
The figures throughout the rest of the Article are based on 140
death-sentenced defendants, rather than the correct total of 142,
and a total of 583 cases rather than 585, because just as this
Article was going to press the author found two defendants he
missed in the initial “Death Row USA” comparisons. The
inclusion of these two defendants would have no significant
effect on the Article's analyses. More information about these
two defendants are included at the end of Appendix D. Of the
140 death-sentenced defendants, 126 were first-time death
sentences and fourteen were resentences after appellate
100
See http://www.naacpldf.org (follow “Publications” hyperlink; then follow
“Death Row USA” hyperlink).
101
There are actually three tasks. One is to identify names making their first
appearance from one report to the next—those who are death-sentenced for the first
time. The second is to identify which names have become “unbracketed” from one
report to the next—a name in brackets indicates a death-sentenced inmate whose
sentence has been overturned and further legal action is pending, so a name becoming
unbracketed means the death sentence has again been imposed. The third task is to
track down each unbracketed name to see whether it is unbracketed because the
defendant was resentenced to death at the trial level (in which case it should be
included in our database), or whether an overturned death sentence was reinstated by
an appellate court (not to be included in our database).
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reversals. Early in 2005, however, the Supreme Court ruled
the death penalty unconstitutional for offenders who were less
than eighteen years of age at the time of the murder.102 There
were two death sentences of seventeen-year-olds in 2004.103
These defendants were left in the database because they
indicate how the capital punishment system was working at
the time the sentences were imposed. The two death sentences
that will be reversed are simply the first of many of these
sentences that will ultimately not withstand appellate review.
The next step after finding the names of the deathsentenced defendants was to search on the Web for details
about each defendant. Factual information was found for
about 80% percent of the defendants through newspaper
databases on Westlaw and Lexis. For the remaining cases
general Web searches were undertaken. These occasionally
yielded no results—for those few cases facts were developed
through telephone calls to prosecutors, defense lawyers, or
newspaper reporters.104
Two other sets of defendants needed to be examined to
be compared with the death sentence cases: those whose
sentencer (usually a jury) spared them from death, and those
who were spared from death by prosecutorial decisions not to
seek or to bargain away the death penalty. There is nothing in
existence like “Death Row USA” to collect these two sets of
cases. The recent burgeoning of searchable online databases of
newspapers, however, combined with the fact that deatheligible cases are highly newsworthy, enabled compilation of
large numbers of cases in both these sets (although compiling
such sets of cases is a laborious, time-consuming task). Date
restricted searches of “death /s sentence” and a couple of more
specific searches105 identified 120 defendants in 2004 who were
102

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
See App. D, DS 57, 134. The database searches also revealed three
seventeen-year-olds who were spared by sentencers, see App. E, SS 50, 68, 117, and six
sixteen or seventeen-year-olds who were spared by prosecutors. See App. F, PS 2, 96,
111, 239, 258, 311. See also David McCord, Uncondensed Appendices to Lightning Still
Strikes, (Feb. 26, 2006) (on file with author), available at http://facstaff.law.drake.edu/
david.mccord/brooklynAppendices.pdf [hereinafter Uncondensed Appendices].
104
See Uncondensed Appendices, supra note 103, at App. D, DS 48, 21, 63, 91,
79, 81, 85, 132, 135, 140.
105
I also used “death /s sentence /s jury /s spared” and “death /s sentence /s
plea /s avoid.” These searches generated only a few additional cases. Of course, the
simple “death /s sentence” generated an enormous number of irrelevant hits, but
experimentation showed that any more restrictive search excluded too many relevant
articles.
103
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spared a death sentence by a sentencer, and 323 defendants
who were spared from death sentences by prosecutors. The
three sets of defendants will be referred to as “DeathSentenced” defendants (numbered with the prefix “DS” in
Appendix D), “Sentencer-Spared” defendants (numbered with
the prefix “SS” in Appendix E), and “Prosecutor-Spared”
defendants (numbered with the prefix “PS” in Appendix F).
B. The Strengths and Weaknesses of the News Reports as
Research Tools
Using news reports as the primary data source to
analyze the death penalty system is not the traditional
research approach. The traditional technique, pioneered by
Professor David Baldus and his colleagues, is to choose a
discrete time period in the past in a particular jurisdiction,
identify as many homicides as possible during that period,
develop rubrics for coding the pertinent facts, train researchers
(often law students) to recognize those facts, and then send
those researchers to mine the court files and other available
documentation (including news reports) to complete the
rubrics. Once the data is mined, statistician members of the
team apply their methods (often some form of multiple
regression analysis) to attempt to determine what facts seem to
have important effects on the outcomes of the cases.106
The “Baldus technique” generates wonderfully rich and
complete data, and well-supported and illuminating results.
The news report approach used in this Article is not an
equivalent of the Baldus technique. The Baldus technique
does, though, have three drawbacks. First, it is quite laborintensive and expensive, even when limited to a particular time
frame in a specific jurisdiction, and thus has never been
attempted on a nationwide basis. By contrast, a news report
106
The most famous study, by Professor Baldus and his colleagues, concerned
about 1,000 homicides in Georgia over a seven-year period in the 1970’s. See DAVID C.
BALDUS ET AL., CHARGING AND SENTENCING OF MURDER AND VOLUNTARY
MANSLAUGHTER
CASES
IN
GEORGIA,
1973-1979
(1981),
available
at
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/NACJD-STUDY/09264.xml.
This study is
famous because it underlay the nearly-successful challenge to capital punishment on
the basis of racial discrimination in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), which
held in a five to four decision that statistical evidence of racial discrimination is
insufficient to demonstrate an unconstitutionally racially-motivated death sentence in
a particular case. For another example of the Baldus technique, see Baldus, et al.,
Racial Discrimination, supra note 8, at 1662-1710, which describes the methodology
and analysis of 524 death-eligible cases in Philadelphia from three time periods—198385, 1986-89, and 1990-93—for racial effects.
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approach is relatively inexpensive and can attain a nationwide
overview, albeit with much less detail and completeness.
Second, the Baldus technique’s thoroughness means that by
the time its results are compiled and analyzed, they are at
least a couple of years old. By contrast, the approach in this
Article enables study of a very recent set of cases. The third
drawback of the Baldus technique is that the statistical
analysis, while very illuminating, is also quite difficult for the
non-statistically-inclined to understand. By contrast, this
Article uses simple arithmetic to compile its results and is
therefore in some ways more accessible. Thus, while the
Baldus technique constitutes state-of-the-art research, it is
hoped that this Article’s approach provides a different and
valuable perspective.
This Article’s approach will be useful, though, only to
the extent it is based on reliable data. Three questions must be
asked: 1) Which defendants are present in, and missing from,
the three sets? 2) How complete is the information that can be
gleaned from the news reports about the defendants that were
found? 3) How confident should we be that the facts were
correctly reported?
As to which defendants are included, the three sets of
cases are asymmetric: every single Death-Sentenced defendant
is included because of their availability through the “Death
Row USA” reports, but defendants in Sentencer-Spared and
Prosecutor-Spared sets were only found if intensive online
searching turned up at least one news report relating to their
cases. While an estimate can be assayed concerning the
minimum number of defendants missing from the SentencerSpared and Prosecutor-Spared sets,107 the missing defendants
107
It is possible to do a very rough calculation of the percentage of murder
convictions in death penalty states that is represented by this Article’s sample of 583
defendants. As of the most recent year for which data is available—2002—the Bureau
of Justice Statistics estimated there were 8,990 murder and non-negligent
manslaughter convictions nationwide.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST.
STATISTICS, STATE COURT SENTENCING OF CONVICTED FELONS 2002 tbl.4.1 (2005),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/scscf02.pdf. Let’s assume that figure
held about steady for 2004. Next, according to the most recent census—2004—about
13% of the U.S. population resides in non-death-penalty states. See U.S. DEP’T OF
COM., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATE AND COUNTY QUICK FACTS,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2006). The
estimated population of the United States was 293,655,404 as of July 1, 2004.
Approximately 38,175,203, or about 13%, resided in the twelve non-death penalty
states: Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Let’s assume that
percentage held about steady also. Finally, let’s assume that the percentage of murder
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are problematic because they derogate from the ideal condition
of a complete database of all death-eligible defendants whose
cases were resolved in 2004. The silver lining in this cloud,
however, is that the missing defendants could only strengthen
the Article’s case for arbitrariness: additional SentencerSpared and Prosecutor-Spared defendants would decrease the
robustness of the death-sentencing rate, perhaps dramatically.
Second, how completely are the facts of each case
reported? The most complete reporting is of factors that make
the defendant more blameworthy—what this Article will later
describe as “depravity points.” Since it is primarily these
factors that make the cases newsworthy to begin with,
reporters are quite good about highlighting them. Reporters
focus on mitigating factors less often. One reason may be that
those factors are deemed to be of less interest to the public.
Another reason is that in the Prosecutor-Spared set of
defendants, often the mitigating factors are unknown because
the penalty phase was not litigated. Nonetheless, there is
sufficient reporting of mitigating factors to derive very definite
patterns.108
Third, how confident should we be that the reporters
correctly reported the information? This Article relies on
media self-policing—presumably reporters who get things
wrong consistently will not be reporting long enough to bias the
sample. Internal checks also help validate the reporting of the
facts, because almost every defendant generated multiple news
articles, and it was rare to find discrepancies among the facts
reported in the different articles.
Thus, while recognizing that the sample of cases is
imperfect, this Article will proceed on the premise that the data
are qualitatively and quantitatively sufficient to permit
comparison between the set of defendants who received death
sentences, and the sets of those who were eligible to, but did
not. Whatever the flaws in these data, they are certainly

convictions in non-death-penalty states was equal to their population percentage, that
is, 13%. We can then subtract 13% of 8,990 (1,169) to arrive at a guess that there were
about 7,821 murder and non-negligent manslaughter convictions in death penalty
states in 2004. Thus, this article’s sample of 583 equals about 7.5% of those 7,821
convictions. What lurks within the missing 92% or so is of great interest. What does
not lurk are death-sentenced defendants, because they are all accounted for through
the “Death Row USA” reports.
108
See infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
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better than anything on which the Court relied in Furman.109
The Furman majority’s conclusion of arbitrariness could be
more accurately described as impressionistic than empirical.
Finally, at a bare minimum, the news reports contain several
odd, startling, and remarkable moments, ten of which are set
forth in Appendix H.
C. Overview of the Three Sets of Defendants
Jurisdictions: The number of defendants in each of the
three sets is detailed by jurisdiction in Appendix A. The
jurisdictions with the most total defendants from all three sets
are not surprising—they are several of the populous and active
(at least in terms of litigating death-sentencings, although not
necessarily in terms of carrying them out) death penalty
jurisdictions: Texas (72),110 Florida (54), California (38),
Pennsylvania (38), North Carolina (31), Ohio (31), and the
federal government (29). The next tier down in terms of
activity is comprised of Louisiana (21), Oklahoma (20), and
Virginia (20) and Illinois (19).
Years of the crimes: Appendix B sets forth the years of
the crimes for which the defendants were being prosecuted. A
relatively small number of the crimes date from before 1995,
and several of those that do, date back to the 1970’s and 1980’s.
Most of the pre-1995 crimes involved resentencings after
appellate reversals (sometimes more than one in a case),
although a smattering were newly solved due to DNA
technology. A fair number of crimes occurred between 1995
and 1999. These also often involved resentencings or newly
solved cases, although a couple experienced long delays in the
original proceeding due to legal maneuvering. The bulk of the
109
The members of the majority relied primarily on their personal experiences
in dealing with death cases while on the Court, most explicitly in Justice White’s
reliance on his “10 years of almost daily exposure to the facts and circumstances of
hundreds and hundreds of federal and state criminal cases involving crimes for which
death is the authorized penalty.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White,
J., concurring). The opinions are conspicuously lacking any empirical analysis, or any
citation of empirical research, except for raw figures on numbers of death sentences in
various years, and some additional raw figures about racial distribution of death
sentences.
110
Contrary to popular belief, however, Texas is not the most gung-ho state
for the death penalty. See Maro Robbins, Texas Not Really Executioners’ Mecca, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Mar. 13, 2004, at 1A (citing statistics showing that Texas
imposed death sentences at a rate just below the national average, and that while
Texas is swifter than most states in carrying out death sentences, it is not the swiftest;
there is, though, great variation among Texas’s 254 counties).
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crimes—76% of Death-Sentenced defendants, 78% of SentenceSpared
defendants,
and
85%
of
Prosecutor-Spared
defendants—were recent, that is, from the four-year period
between 2000 and 2004.
Ages of defendants: The ages of defendants within a year
of the times of the crimes are set forth in Appendix C.111 In
creating the age categories, those categories toward the low end
of the age range were formulated to encompass fewer years (1617, 18-19, and 20-21) than the ones toward the higher end of
the range (22-25, 26-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60+). This
method was based on the theory that youthful age can count as
a mitigating factor, but that any age above twenty-one is
unlikely to be considered particularly mitigating by a
sentencer. The primary conclusion that can be drawn from
Appendix C is that the proportion of defendants in each age
group does not vary significantly among the Death-Sentenced,
Sentencer-Spared, and Prosecutor-Spared groups. Of the 547
defendants whose ages were revealed by the news reports, 517
were between eighteen and forty-nine years of age. Only
eleven defendants were sixteen to seventeen years of age (and
they would not even be eligible for death sentences as of March
On the other end of the spectrum, only four
2005).112
defendants were sixty or older, and only fifteen were between
fifty and fifty-nine years of age. While the death sentence rates
do not progress in linear fashion, there is an overall trend of
slightly higher rates with increasing age after age twenty-nine,
presumably because sentencers believe that the older a person
becomes, the more likely they are to know better than to
murder someone. The only seeming anomaly is that while one
might expect the death-sentencing rate to be less in the
eighteen to nineteen age group than in the older age groups,
sentencers levied death sentences in the eighteen to nineteen
age group at a higher rate than in the twenty to twenty-one
and twenty-six to twenty-nine age groups.
111

Sometimes a defendant’s age at the time of the crime is clear because a
news report contemporaneous with the crime gives the defendant’s name. For many
defendants, though, the news articles date from a later year after the case has
progressed through the system. For these defendants, the news reports commonly give
the defendant’s age at the time the article is written. Thus, for example, if the crime
was committed in 2001, and the news report comes from 2002 and gives the
defendant’s age as twenty-two at that time, the defendant might have been twenty-one
at the time of the crime, or, depending on his birthday, might have been twenty-two.
112
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005) (holding persons who
were under age eighteen at the time of commission of an otherwise death-eligible crime
are ineligible to receive a death sentence due to youthful age).
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Appendices B and C demonstrate that the DeathSentenced, Sentencer-Spared, and Prosecutor-Spared sets of
defendants are suitable for direct comparison: there are
sufficient numbers of each, and the sets are not skewed
relevant to when the crimes were committed or the ages at
which defendants committed them.
D. The Depravity Point Calculator: A Method for Determining
the “Worst” Murderers
There are two steps in determining the “worst of the
worst” murderers. The first step is to determine which
murderers are the “worst” based on aggravation level. The
second step asks whether, considering the mitigating evidence,
these “worst” murderers seem like the “worst of the worst.”
The purpose of this sub-part is to explain the Depravity Point
Calculator—a method used for performing the first step of the
analysis, that is, for determining the “worst” murderers in
terms of aggravation.113
The Depravity Point Calculator is a means for
The
comparing the aggravation levels of defendants.114
Depravity Point Calculator has two aspects. First, it lists most
of the factors that can make a case more aggravated. These
factors were generated by reading hundreds of news reports, on
the theory that reporters have a good idea of what matters to
the public. Most of the factors are based on common sense, and
many track the aggravating circumstances in death penalty
statutes.115 The second aspect of the Depravity Point Calculator
is that it assigns a weight to each factor; it may assign a weight
of ‘3’ (most aggravating), ‘2’ (next-most aggravating), or ‘1’
(least aggravating).116 This section lists each aggravating
factor, categorized by weight.
113

Consideration of the effects of mitigation evidence will be undertaken later.
See infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
114
I make no claim that this system always comes up with precisely the right
rank order of cases. Many other, and possibly better, systems could be conceived. I do
believe, though, that any rational system of ranking the aggravation level of the cases
would come out with results that do not differ much.
115
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 1999 & Supp. 2005); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-202 (West 2005).
116
The Depravity Point Calculator 3-weight factors closely track the analysis
of factors that could increase the likelihood of a death sentence, as identified in a study
by noted researchers examining a large sample of Georgia homicides a couple of
decades ago. See David C. Baldus, et al., Law and Statistics in Conflict: Reflections on
McCleskey v. Kemp, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 251 (D. K. Kagehiro &
W.S. Laufer eds., 1992). Seven of the nine most aggravating factors found in that
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3-weight factors. These nine factors are the most aggravating;
indeed, the presence of any one of them is sufficient to put a
defendant within the category of the “worst” murderers:
Additional murder. Since every death-eligible case
involves at least one murder, the first murder is a given and
does not add depravity points—thus, only a multiple
murderer would accrue depravity points on this factor. But,
as is true with most of the factors, a defendant can accrue
the factor more than once; for example, a triple murderer
would accrue this factor once for each additional murder
beyond the first (2 additional murders times 3 depravity
points, for a total of 6 depravity points). Further, murder of
a visibly pregnant woman (or one known by the defendant
to be pregnant even though the pregnancy is not visible)
counts as an additional murder for the killing of the fetus.
Sexual assault.
Avenge official acts. The murder was committed to
avenge the actions of a governmental official, like a judge,
prosecutor, or police officer. This does not include a spur-ofthe-moment killing of a police officer, which is a 2-weight
factor. The “avenge official acts” factor was rare in 2004,
present in only one case.117
Insurance, etc. motive. The murder was committed
with great premeditation for crassly pecuniary reasons.
(This does not include murder committed during an armed
robbery, which is a 2-weight factor.)
Torture. The victim was subjected to prolonged physical
torture before death. (Relatively short suffering, no matter
how appalling the defendant’s actions, does not qualify;
instead, it would qualify for one of the 2-weight factors.)
Prisoner/escapee. The defendant was a prisoner or
escapee at the time of the murder, which strongly indicates
that the defendant needs to be wholly incapacitated through
death so that he cannot kill again while imprisoned or after
an escape.
Incarceration violence.
While imprisoned the
defendant committed serious acts of violence against
correctional officers or other inmates.
Again, the
incapacitation argument is obvious.

study comprise seven of the nine of the Depravity Point Calculator 3-weight factors:
avenge official acts; torture (physical); insurance, etc. motive; sexual assault; additional
murder; prisoner/escapee; and murder for hire. Id. at 260. I excluded “mental torture
involved” as being too nebulous, and included incarceration violence and terrorist
motive. Admittedly, limiting the aggravation weight to three levels is simplistic, but
some concessions had to be made for ease of use.
117
See Jovan House (SS 96, App. E) and Raymond Saunders (PS 188, App. F).
These culprits and a cohort ambushed a Baltimore police detective as revenge for
testimony the detective had given against Saunders’s half brother.
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Murder for hire. Like the “Insurance, etc. motive,” this
shows great deliberation, and a crassly pecuniary way of
thinking about the value of human life.
Terrorist motive.
political statement.

Murder was committed to make a

2-weight factors. These twenty-five factors are very serious:
Attempted murder.
Robbery. This is a very frequently occurring factor, and
some argue that it results in a great deal of overinclusion.118 Robbery, however, is an extremely serious
contemporaneous felony, and cannot be ignored—indeed, it
correctly matters greatly to both prosecutors and
sentencers.119 Although an armed robbery where the victim
is killed should not in-and-of-itself qualify for deatheligibility, there are plenty of robber-murderers who are
among the worst criminals because they accrue additional
depravity points for other factors. There is one limiting
principle—no matter how many robberies a defendant
committed, he could accrue this factor a maximum of two
times. This was necessary because as to a very few
defendants who committed numerous robberies in which the
victims were not physically injured, counting 2 depravity
points for each robbery seemed to overstate their relative
culpability.
Kidnapping.
Arson.
Serious assault. This is something short of attempted
murder, but still showing a great propensity for violence.
This factor appears most often in aggravated domestic
violence cases.
Escape or escape attempt. A prior escape, or escape
attempt by a defendant shows a possible need for the
ultimate in incapacitation. (If the defendant committed a
118
Even one of the few academics to strongly support capital punishment,
Professor Robert Blecker, has said, “But, the majority of people on death row are
robber-murderers, who did not commit the kind of killings that qualify them as ‘the
worst of the worst.’” Symposium, supra note 13, at 176. I have not checked Professor
Blecker’s assertion that the “majority” of death row inmates are robber-murderers, nor
his implication that they are robber-murderers without any additional aggravating
factors. In fact, I doubt that either assertion is empirically correct. For example, of the
140 defendants sentenced to death in 2004, slightly less than half of them (sixty-eight)
had robbery as part of the reason they were sentenced to death (for most, the robbery
conviction was one of the reasons for a death sentence). Further, for many of the sixtyeight, there were additional aggravating factors beyond the robbery.
119
Thus Recommendation 28 of the Illinois Commission on Capital
Punishment, Report of the Governor’s Commission on Capital Punishment (2002),
available
at
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission_report/
complete_report.pdf, arguing for not counting contemporaneous felonies (including
robbery) to make murderers death-eligible is completely contrary to justice and
common sense.
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murder while an escapee, this would not be counted here,
but as a 3-weight factor).
Gang involvement or drug dealing. This refers either
to serious gang involvement, or major drug dealing. These
activities often overlap; to avoid over-counting, a defendant
involved in gang-related drug dealing only accrues these
depravity points once.
Other substantial record. A criminal record indicating
long-running antisocial behavior (but not including any of
the other crimes already listed—sexual assault, attempted
murder, robbery, kidnapping, arson, or serious assault—
which would be counted in those categories).
Police officer victim. Police and prosecutors seem to
view this as one of the worst factors and would surely argue
that it should be classified as a 3-weight factor. But
considered dispassionately, killing an officer, which usually
occurs spontaneously, does not seem to be a sine qua non of
the worst criminals. In any event, many killers of police
officers accrue depravity points in other ways that clearly
put them among the worst criminals.
Victim 12 or younger. Our hearts go out to victims who
seem less able to protect themselves; the image of the
promise of a young life cut short haunts us. A murderer
who kills a child seems particularly heartless.
Multiple stab/bludgeon. This factor, and the remaining
2-weight factors, all involve particularly gruesome ways of
committing the murder, or acts evidencing particularly evil
mind-sets. Multiple stabbing or bludgeoning illustrates a
great capacity for violence.
Poisoning/starvation.
premeditation.

This is indicative of great

Strangulation, etc. There are several means of killing
that involve disabling the respiratory system: strangulation,
suffocation, cutting the throat, and drowning. These all
inflict severe suffering on the victim, and indicate
premeditation on the part of the killer.
Burning to death. Causing death by burns or by smoke
inhalation obviously involves severe pain to the victim and
premeditation by the killer.
Execution-style/rifle/shotgun. This includes infliction
of a wound to the head at close range when the victim is at
the defendant’s mercy. This also includes any murder
committed with a rifle or shotgun, which requires more
planning than handgun murders.
Three or more shots with a handgun.
indicative of a serious bent toward violence.

This is

Multiple violence. This refers to situations in which the
victim was subjected to more than one type of physical
injury by the killer. This is a fallback category—if the
multiple forms of violence are any of the ones listed above,
they would be included there. Thus, this category consists
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mostly of cases where the killer beat the victim, but not in a
way that is severe enough to be multiple bludgeoning to
cause death, and then killed the victim by another means.
Multiple forms of violence indicate a particular propensity
for violence.
Victim bound. The killer bound the victim before the
murder, thus indicating that the victim is particularly
vulnerable, and the crime particularly premeditated.
Victim begged. There is evidence that the victim begged
for life, thus indicating the defendant’s premeditation and
callousness in killing the victim anyway.
In presence of child. Killing the victim in the presence
of a child is heinous because of the trauma inflicted on the
child, particularly when—as is true in many cases—when
the victim is the child’s relative.120
In the presence of a parent. Killing a minor child in
front of the child’s parent is very depraved.121
Hate crime. Murder of a victim for reasons of race,
ethnicity, religious belief, or sexual orientation shows a
particularly warped mind.
Violated court order. This factor arises in domestic
violence situations where a woman has obtained a
protective order against a man, but he violates it and kills
her. Such a killer exhibits particular contempt for the rule
of law.
Relish killing. This refers to actions before or during the
murder indicating that the defendant enjoyed the killing.122
Mutilate corpse. Dismembering a corpse, carving words
into it, burning it, or the like, illustrates a particularly evil
state of mind.
1-weight factors. These eight factors are heinous, but not to the
degree of the 2 and 3-weight factors:
Home burglary. This is a particularly frightening factor,
and would warrant a 2-weighting except for the fact that

120

The defendant does not accrue these depravity points if he also kills the
child, but, of course, he would then accrue other depravity points for multiple victims
and for a child aged 12 or younger.
121
If the parent is also killed, these depravity points are not accrued, but
rather the defendant accrues depravity points for an additional murder.
122
See DS 37 (App. D) (defendant wrote on wall of murder scene in lipstick:
“Killing is my business now”); DS 43 (App. D) (defendant, a prisoner, wrote in letter
before murder of another inmate that he was waiting for cops to “mess up” and leave
him around another inmate “so I can test my hand”); DS 70 (App. D) (defendant, who
knew victim was celebrating birthday, yelled “Happy birthday!” as he stabbed victim
thirteen times in neck in parking lot); DS 119 (App. D) (defendant shot and killed one
victim and taunted second victim between gunshots); PS 9 (App. F) (defendant chose to
kill eight-month pregnant woman by stabbing her rather than shooting her so she
would suffer more); PS 61 (App. F) (defendant forced victim to strip and walk into
grave before he shot her, boasting afterward about watching her head explode).
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invariably a defendant who commits a home-invasion
burglary does so to commit one of the crimes that is a 3weight (sexual assault) or 2-weight (most often robbery)
factor. As a result, counting the home invasion as a
separate 2-weight factor would be over-counting.
Luring victim. For a defendant to lure the victim to the
site of the murder indicates premeditation.
Grave risk to others. This factor is narrowly construed
to limit it to use of an assault rifle in a public locale
outdoors, use of an explosive device, or firing multiple shots
indoors in a crowded room.
Callous attitude after. Actions such as eating the
victim’s food after the murder, watching television in the
room with the victim’s body, and the like, indicate that the
defendant is so heartless that the murder seems like a
relatively normal life event to him.
Victim complied with robbery.
This refers to
instances of robbery in which the victim complied with the
robbery demand, or was shot before the victim was even
given a chance to comply. Such behavior indicates the
defendant’s hardness of heart in killing the victim when the
murder was unnecessary to accomplish the underlying
felony.
Victim 70 or older/frail. Elderly victims tug at our
hearts in terms of their relative vulnerability (although less
so than children because the promise of a long life is less),
as do disabled victims.
Motive eliminate witness. This factor is narrowly
construed to limit it to situations where the defendant killed
to eliminate a witness not contemporaneous with another
felony.123
Dumping/burying body. These actions, like mutilating
the corpse (although in a less perverse way) indicate
callousness of heart.

A tally sheet of all aggravating factors divided by
category was used to rate the aggravation level of each case.
The tally sheet was transformed into individual depravity point
grids for each defendant by deletion of irrelevant aggravating
factors. These grids allowed for the calculation of the depravity
point totals for each defendant; these are the totals that appear
in Appendices D, E, and F.
123
As to contemporaneous killing during felonies like sexual assault, robbery,
and kidnapping, it can always be argued that the purpose of the murder was to
eliminate the victim as a witness; however, this aspect of those felonies is already
factored into the higher weight assigned to them. There are, however, quite a few
cases where defendants, with premeditation, set out to eliminate witnesses to crimes in
the past. These are separate incidents that should accrue a separate depravity point.
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The Depravity Point Calculator provides not only a
means to analyze the relative level of aggravation of murders,
but also a means of determining which murderers are not
aggravated enough to be death-worthy. Clearly, a murderer
who accrues no depravity points is not among the “worst”
(which is not to downplay the fact that every murder is
horrible—but the task here is to determine which murderers
are the “worst”). Who, then, are these no-depravity-point,
“normal” murderers? Typically, they fall into one of four
categories:124 they are those who kill an adult in a domestic
context (usually husband/wife, boyfriend/girlfriend) relatively
spontaneously; kill an acquaintance during a disagreement,
often when both parties are intoxicated; kill a relative stranger
at a bar or nightclub, again often when both parties are
intoxicated; or kill in a dispute over illegal drugs. Almost
invariably these murders are accomplished with one or two
handgun or knife wounds. These “normal” murders in fact
account for the bulk of wrongful homicides, making murders
that have aggravating factors stand out as being worse than
normal murders.
If, however, we are seeking the “worst” murderers, it is
not sufficient to exclude only murderers who accrue no
depravity points. There are also some low-depravity-point
murderers who are “very bad,” but not among the “worst.”
Specifically, the intuitive cut-off point for the “worst” seems to
fall at the level of 6 depravity points, unless a lower-depravity
point case includes a 3-weight factor. Put differently, any
murderer with a 3-weight factor, or any murderer with 6 or
more depravity points, falls into the “worst” category; any
murderer with a 1 or 2 depravity point score, or a 3-to-5 score
that does not include a 3-weight factor, does not. The reader, of
course, is free to peruse the online detailed versions of
Appendices D, E, and F125 and to draw the line elsewhere. But
it is hard to dispute that a murderer with any of the 3-weight
124

See DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 164 (1991)
(reporter who spent a year with Baltimore homicide detectives comments that there
are only “rare victims for whom death is not the inevitable consequence of a longrunning domestic feud or a stunted pharmaceutical career”); David McCord, A Year in
the Life of Death: Murders and Capital Sentences in South Carolina, 1998, 53 S.C. L.
REV. 249, 271-72 (2002) (finding that of the 153 homicides in South Carolina in 1998
about which information was available, twenty were spontaneous killings among
persons with close relationships, twenty-nine were acquaintance disputes, nine arose
at a bar or nightclub between strangers, and fourteen arose out of drug disputes—for a
total of 72 of 153).
125
See Uncondensed Appendices, supra note 103.
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factors is among the “worst” in terms of aggravation. It is also
hard to see how a murderer with a depravity point total above
6 would avoid being classified as one of the “worst,” given that
to attain that status a defendant would have to accrue either
two 3-weight factors, a 3-weight factor and two other factors, or
no 3-weight factors but at least three other factors. On the
other hand, murderers with 5 or fewer depravity points that do
not include a 3-weight factor just do not seem to measure up to
the appellation of the “worst.” They are very bad criminals, but
not the “worst” when one sees how many more aggravated
murders exist.
Appendix D summarizes, analyzes, and calculates the
depravity points for each of the 140 Death-Sentenced
defendants, and arranges the cases in order from most to least
depraved. Appendices E and F do the same for the 120
Sentencer-Spared defendants and the 323 Prosecutor-Spared
defendants, respectively.
E. Mitigation and the “Worst of the Worst”
The first step in determining the “worst of the worst,” as
we have just seen, is to create a means for identifying the
“worst” based on aggravation. We now move to the second
step—factoring in mitigation to eliminate some defendants
from the “worst of the worst,” leaving those who truly are the
“worst of the worst.” This step of the analysis is much trickier.
While most people will agree on what factors aggravate a
murder, and on roughly how much those factors count in
aggravation, there are bound to be great differences of opinion
about what factors are mitigating and how much weight to
accord them. For example, does the fact that the defendant
became dangerous due to a traumatic childhood strongly
mitigate, or does it actually aggravate because it shows a
future propensity for violence?
Does the fact that the
defendant was high on illegal drugs at the time of the murder
mitigate the crime, or have no effect because the defendant
chose to ingest the substance? And if a traumatic childhood or
an illegal high counts as mitigation, how does a sentencer
balance such a factor against the aggravation, for example, of a
triple homicide? These perplexities are so profound that it was
impossible to devise a “mitigation point” system equivalent to
the Depravity Point Calculator.
Despite the inability to quantify mitigation, the news
reports provide helpful information in figuring out a way to
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factor in the effects of mitigation. The reports show three
things. First, mitigating evidence predictably falls into one of
six categories: 1) horrific upbringing, 2) mental problems
(retardation, insanity, or diagnosable and serious mental
problems short of insanity), 3) intoxication or an illegal drug
habit, 4) relative youthful age, 5) higher culpability of another
culprit in a multiple perpetrator scenario, and 6) positive
character traits of the defendants. For each of the 260 DeathSentenced and Sentencer-Spared defendants in Appendices D
and E, the types of mitigation evidence that were offered, as
gleaned from the news reports, are charted below the depravity
point grids. This mitigation evidence offered and noted in the
news sources was analyzed and can be accessed on the online
database.
The second thing the news reports show about
mitigating evidence is that it sometimes causes sentencers to
refuse to impose, and prosecutors to forego, seeking a death
sentence. Mitigation is surely one of the primary factors that
decrease the robustness of the death-sentencing rate.126 It is
important to bear in mind, however, that the effect of
mitigating evidence in any particular case on either sentencers
or prosecutors is wholly unpredictable.
The third thing the news reports show about mitigation
is not intuitively obvious: the kinds of mitigation evidence are,
on average, about the same in prevalence and degree anywhere
along the depravity point scale—the mitigation evidence
presented by a defendant with a 5 point depravity score is
likely to be very similar to that presented by a defendant with
a 30+ point depravity score. That is because the types of
mitigation that can be offered fall into the limited number of
categories listed above, and, as will be discussed below, end up
sounding quite similar across the range of defendants.
As to the prevalence of mitigation evidence, Appendix G
shows a breakdown of the types of mitigation offered in the
Death-Sentenced and Sentencer-Spared cases (although a fair
proportion of cases—sixty-seven out of 260—fall into the
“unknown” mitigation category because reporters are not as
126

Indeed, one suspects that it is the primary factor for sentencers, since the
only other possible factors are that the murder is simply not depraved enough
(unlikely, since almost any aggravated murder seems very depraved to most jurors), or
that a juror gets cold feet and cannot “pull the trigger” on a death sentence (something
that probably happens with some regularity). As to prosecutors, potential mitigation is
certainly a significant factor in foregoing seeking death sentences, but not the only one,
and often not the most important one—as we will see later. See infra pp. 856-864.
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assiduous in reporting mitigation evidence as in reporting the
facts of the crimes). The primary finding is that defense
lawyers have learned the value of “human frailty” mitigation—
the first four categories listed above (horrific upbringing,
mental problems, drug habit/intoxication, and youthful age).
Below is a chart that shows the proportion of cases in each of
six depravity point ranges in which the defendants offered
human frailty mitigation, where mitigation was mentioned in
the news reports:
Depravity Point Level Death-Sentenced Sentencer-Spared
30+
7/8
3/4
20-29
7/7
6/6
15-19
13/14
5/5
10-14
23/31
13/14
7-9
18/21
13/16
6 or less
14/17
11/15
The rates in each category are very high, and are comparable
between
the
Death-Sentenced
and
Sentencer-Spared
defendants. Even in the few cases where human frailty
evidence was not reported, one or both of the other two types of
mitigation evidence (not primary culprit, positive character)
was almost always presented. In fact, according to the news
reports, only eight defendants punted on mitigation, either by
refusing to permit their attorneys to present evidence or
argument on mitigation, or by trying to undermine the case for
a non-death sentence by requesting death from the sentencer.127
As to the degree of the mitigation evidence, there is no
way to quantify it. But there is a state-of-the-art method of
discovering and presenting mitigating evidence that good
capital defense lawyers have learned that includes extensive
background research and psychological testing (assuming the
lawyers are good, and that they have the resources to do the
investigation).128
127
See DS 4, 6, 16, 24, 48, 61, 71, and 92 (App. D). But see SS 45, 37, and 98
(App. E) (defendants requested a death sentence, but the sentencer declined to impose
it).
128
See John M. Fabian, Death Penalty Mitigation and the Role of the Forensic
Psychologist, 27 L. & PSYCH. REV. 73 (2003) (explaining psychological mitigation
opportunities); Daniel L. Payne, Building the Case for Life: A Mitigation Specialist as
a Necessity and a Matter of Right, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 43 (2003) (explaining how mitigation
evidence should be unearthed and presented); David L. Beck, Investigator Digs Deep
into Minds of Killers: Keeping Clients Off Death Row, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July

2005]

LIGHTNING STILL STRIKES

843

Once such investigations are undertaken, they tend to
turn up an eerily similar pattern for most capital defendants: a
horribly neglected/abused upbringing that results in mental
problems that lead to drug and alcohol abuse, and eventually to
a depraved murder.129 While it is certainly true that there are
better and worse ways of presenting this evidence, and that
good lawyering can make a huge difference, the basic core of
mitigating evidence concerning capital defendants sounds
about the same, no matter how depraved the crime.
It bears repeating that mitigation evidence is not
factored in via the Depravity Point Calculator, and the effect of
mitigation in any particular case is unpredictable. Even
though the effect of mitigation in any particular case is wholly
unpredictable, the effect over the run of cases in a nonarbitrary system should be that the death-sentencing rate goes
up as the depravity point level increases. On the other hand, if
the death-sentencing rate does not go up as the depravity point
level rises, that would be good evidence that the effects of
mitigation are so unpredictable as to pervade the system with
arbitrariness (although there would be other culprits for
arbitrariness, as well). We will examine whether the deathsentencing rate increases with depravity level shortly.130

10, 2005, at A6 (explaining the techniques and unlikely successes of mitigation
specialist Margy Erickson). Another resource is the annual “Life in the Balance”
Conference sponsored by the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, one of
many such capital defense training opportunities. According to the promotional
material:
NLADA’s Life in the Balance conference brings together mitigation
specialists, defense investigators, and capital defense attorneys from around
the nation to improve their skills and techniques in all aspects of death
penalty defense. Seminars are offered on the latest scientific, medical and
psychiatric developments in capital cases; on the most recent developments
in the law; and on a wide range of creative trial strategies and tactics.
National Legal Aid and Defender Association, http://www.nlada.org/Training/Train_Defender/Train_Defender_Balance (last visited Jan. 28, 2006) (emphasis in
original). Renowned death penalty lawyer Stephen Bright also commented recently,
“The quality of defense lawyering is much better.” Mike Tolson, Fewer Killers Getting
Sentenced to Death, HOUSTON CHRON., May 22, 2005, at A1. On the other hand,
meticulous mitigation is no guarantee of escaping a death sentence. See, e.g., Richard
K. DeAtley & Lisa O’Neill Hill, Abuse Defense Often Fails in Murder Cases, PRESSENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), May 17, 2005, at A1 (detailing some abuse claims in
capital cases in California that have failed over the years).
129
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
130
See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
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F. Two Crucial Charts
Charts 1 and 2, below, will be crucial in answering the
first three sub-questions concerning whether the death penalty
system is arbitrary. Chart 1 collects information from the
Death-Sentenced, Sentencer-Spared, and Prosecutor-Spared
defendants in Appendices D, E, and F. The defendants are
divided into seven depravity point ranges.131 The Chart is
designed to identify cases that are of roughly equal levels of
aggravation, in descending order, to enable analysis of the first
three sub-questions. Chart 2 collects information on “poster
boys” for the death penalty to provide an alternative analysis of
the first three sub-questions.
Before presenting Chart 1, it will be useful to set forth
examples of defendants who fall within each of the seven
ranges.
(Information on all 583 defendants is available
132
online.) Three examples will be presented from each range,
one from the Death-Sentenced database, one from the
Sentencer-Spared database, and one from the ProsecutorSpared database.133 Each case will be briefly summarized in
order to impart a flavor for the kind of defendants who fall into
each category.134
The top category is 30+ depravity points, which could be
considered ridiculously aggravated:
Death-Sentenced: Andrew Urdiales (DS 1)
This serial killer shot Cassandra Corum and dumped her body in a
river. Urdiales confessed to killing seven other women between 1988
and 1996, two in the Chicago area and five in California. These
murders involved kidnappings and sexual assaults, and death by
both shooting and stabbing.
Sentencer-Spared: Terry Nichols (SS 1)
Nichols helped Timothy McVeigh create the bomb that exploded at
the Oklahoma City federal building, killing over 160 people. Nichols

131
While it is somewhat artificial to lump, for example, a 15-point case with a
19-point case in terms of aggravation, a chart listing every single point along the
spectrum would be too cumbersome to be useful.
132
See Uncondensed Appendices, supra note 103, at Apps. D-F.
133
In each instance, we will use the case with the highest number of depravity
points that fits within the range; when there are defendants who are tied for the
highest number of depravity points, we will use the defendant who comes first in
alphabetical order by surname, which is how the defendants are arranged in
Appendices D, E, and F.
134
For a complete analysis of the depravity points, refer to the full summaries
online. Uncondensed Appendices, supra note 103.

2005]

LIGHTNING STILL STRIKES

845

was convicted of 161 counts of first-degree murder as well as one
count each of first-degree arson and conspiracy.
Prosecutor-Spared: Charles Cullen (PS 1)
He admitted to killing at least thirty-three of his patients by
injecting them with drugs during his sixteen months as a critical
care nurse in several hospitals in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.

In the next-most depraved category, defendants in the
20-29 range could be called enormously aggravated:
Death-Sentenced: Douglas Belt (DS 13)
Belt beheaded Lucille Gallegos at an apartment complex where she
worked as a housekeeper. After the murder, Belt set the apartment
on fire to destroy the evidence of the murder. DNA evidence also
tied Belt to six rapes.
Sentencer-Spared: Ronald Hinton (SS 3)
A serial killer who burglarized, sexually assaulted, and strangled
three women in separate attacks.
Prosecutor-Spared: William Floyd Zamastil (PS 22)
He picked up two teenage hitchhikers—a brother and sister—then
bound and bludgeoned them to death. He pleaded guilty and
received two sentences of twenty-five to life; he was already serving
a life sentence in Wisconsin for another murder.

Further down the scale, defendants in the 15-19 range
could be termed extremely aggravated:
Death-Sentenced: Curtis Flowers (DS 29)
Flowers shot four people to death execution-style during the robbery
of a store where he used to work.
Sentencer-Spared: Cody Nielson (SS 12)
Nielson kidnapped, sexually assaulted, and killed a fifteen-year-old
girl, dismembered her body and buried it, and months later returned
to burn what was left of the body.
Prosecutor-Spared: Michael Bechtel (PS 26)
Bechtel shot and killed his estranged wife who had a protective order
against him, as well as their three-year-old son and two of his wife’s
friends.

The next step down the depravity point scale
encompasses defendants in the 10-14 range, who could be
characterized as highly aggravated:
Death-Sentenced: Robert Acuna (DS 57)
He committed a home invasion burglary and robbery of his
neighbors James Carroll (age seventy-five) and Joyce Carroll (age
seventy-four), and shot each of them in the head at close range. He
was arrested five days later at a motel in possession of their car,
some jewelry, and the murder weapon. Several months earlier he
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had been charged with aggravated assault for pulling a knife on an
elderly man in a mall parking lot.
Sentencer-Spared: Coy Evans (SS 23)
He was convicted of murder, burglary, armed kidnapping, armed
robbery and fleeing and eluding law enforcement in the shooting
death of Tallahassee police Sgt. Dale Green. The officer had arrived
to help two women who reported a home-invasion robbery. Evans
shot Green six times, once in the back of the head.
Prosecutor-Spared: Richard Dwight Bernard (PS 52)
He killed three victims. Police found the body of Tasha Robinson in
her home. She had been shot in the head execution-style. The body
of Anthony Rankin, Robinson’s boyfriend, was later found in a
rented van; he had also been shot in the head. Two weeks later, the
remains of thirteen-year-old Marquis Anton Jobes were located in a
field.

At the next level on the spectrum, defendants in the 7-9
range could be described as very aggravated:
Death-Sentenced: Robert Arrington (DS 98)
He robbed and beat to death his girlfriend, Kathy Hutchens, in her
home (and also beat her German Shepherd to death). Arrington had
served five years in prison for strangling his wife in 1986 after he
pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter.
Sentencer-Spared: James Coleman (SS 51)
Coleman strangled his live-in girlfriend in their apartment, then
suffocated her ten-week-old baby and put the baby’s body in the
freezer.
Prosecutor-Spared: Brian Bahr (PS 111)
Bahr lured a twelve-year-old girl into the woods where he raped her,
beat her, and choked her to death, then put her body in a creek.

Defendants in the 3w-6 range (“3w” denotes those cases
of 3, 4, and 5 depravity points that include a 3-weight factor
that makes them death-eligible) could be called moderately
aggravated:
Death-Sentenced: Brenda Andrew (DS 124)
Andrew conspired with her lover to kill her husband for the proceeds
of an $800,000 insurance policy. Andrew and the lover ambushed
her husband with a shotgun in the garage of the Andrew home.
Andrew then claimed that her husband was the victim of a robbery
by two masked men.
Sentencer-Spared: Francisco Cabrialez (SS 80)
Cabrialez burglarized a home to commit a robbery and killed the
homeowner in the process. Cabrialez attacked deputies while in jail
on two occasions.
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Prosecutor-Spared: Jonathon Appley (PS 194)
Appley and a cohort robbed and strangled and beat with a tree
branch a camper at a lake.

Defendants in the 2-5 no3w range (“no3w” denotes cases
that of 3, 4, or 5 depravity points that do not include a 3-weight
factor) could be called not aggravated enough because they
should not be death-eligible:
Death-Sentenced: James Edward Barber (DS 129)
Barber was a handyman who had been doing work for seventy-five
year-old Dorothy Epps. During a robbery, he beat her to death with
a hammer.
Sentencer-Spared: Francisco Carrion (SS 94)
Carrion burglarized the home of an elderly woman and when she
confronted him with a knife, wrestled it away from her and stabbed
her to death.
Prosecutor-Spared: Allan Abruzzino (PS 223)
Abruzzino and an accomplice invaded the Velazquez home and
attempted a robbery. Abruzzino threatened Velazquez’s six-year-old
daughter with a gun to her throat. When Velazquez realized it was
a BB gun, he turned it toward Abruzzino, who in turn pulled out a
knife and stabbed Velazquez.

After this survey of what defendants at various levels of
depravity look like, here is crucial Chart 1:
Chart 1: Death-Sentencing Rates by Depravity Point Level
Depravity
Points
30+
20-29
15-19
10-14
7-9
3w-6
2-5 no3w
Total

Total
Defs.
23
41
64
128
139
71
117
583

DS

SS

PS

12
16
28
41
26
5
12
140

2
9
10
29
29
17
24
120

9
16
26
58
84
49
81
323

Sentencer
Death Rate
86%
64%
74%
59%
47%
23%
33%
54%

Overall
Death Rate
52%
39%
44%
32%
19%
7%
10%
24%

The “Sentencer Death Rate” calculates the percentage of
defendants at a given depravity point level who were sentenced
to death in cases decided by sentencers; the “Overall Death
Rate” calculates the percentage of defendants at a given
depravity point level who were sentenced to death out of all
death-eligible defendants identified, including the ProsecutorSpared defendants. The Chart is crucial because it allows
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analysis of the first three of the four sub-questions of
arbitrariness.
G. Answering the Four Sub-Questions of Arbitrariness
1. Does the System Exclude All Those Who Are Not the
“Worst of the Worst” from Death Sentences?
The system does exclude almost all those who are not
the “worst of the worst” from death sentences. The bottom
number (the defendants with depravity point totals between 2
and 5 without any 3-weight factors) in the Death-Sentenced
category, however, shows that there were twelve defendants
sentenced to death who were not aggravated enough to deserve
it according to the Depravity Point Calculator:135 six robbers
who killed, without much further depravity;136 two defendants
who spontaneously killed a police officer, without much further
depravity;137 two who killed out of jealousy, without much
further depravity;138 and two who killed out of gang motives,
without much further depravity.139 If the news reports included
all the depravity point factors, then these defendants, while
deserving very severe punishment, were not among the “worst”
murderers. It is possible, of course, that more intensive mining
of the case files of these defendants would turn up additional
depravity points not reported in the media that would be
sufficient to boost these defendants over the threshold of deathworthiness.
If no additional depravity points exist, however, these
twelve represent slightly less than 10% of the 140 DeathSentenced defendants. This is not a high percentage, but
neither is it negligible—particularly to those twelve
defendants. This percentage would be especially discouraging
because it would further support the conclusion that the Court

135

Actually, these defendants were not even among the “worst” murderers,
even without considering mitigating factors that may have taken them out of the
“worst of the worst” category. One of them did have powerful evidence that he was
deranged, which should have doubly exempted him from death-worthiness. See App.
D, DS 135.
136
See App. D, DS 128, 129, 130, 133, 134, 136.
137
See App. D, DS 135, 140.
138
See App. D, DS 132, 137.
139
See App. D, DS 131, 138.

2005]

LIGHTNING STILL STRIKES

849

has failed in its primary goal since Furman of eliminating overinclusion.140
2a. Does the System Sentence a Robust Percentage of
the “Worst of the Worst” to Death?
The death sentence rate was 24% among all the
defendants in the sample (140/583). That is well below the
33 1/3% rate this Article uses as a benchmark for robustness.
Further, at only one depravity point level does the overall
death rate even reach 50% (30+). Also, the overall death rate
within the five highest depravity point categories (7-9 through
30+) is 31%, under the 33 1/3% benchmark for robustness
among all death-eligible cases, as is the 27% death rate within
all the categories the depravity point system rates as
aggravated enough to be death-worthy (3w-6 through 30+).
Beyond that, the 24% death-sentencing rate is skewed toward
the high side because all 2004 death sentences are included,
while an undetermined number of non-death resolutions in
death-eligible cases were undoubtedly missed by the database
searches.141 The addition of these missing defendants would
only serve to decrease the robustness of the death-sentencing
ratio, perhaps by many percentage points.
Yet another fact significantly decreases the effective
death-sentencing rate: if we were to examine the 140 death
sentences imposed in 2004 ten years from now, we would
almost certainly find that at least half of them were reversed

140

See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
While it is impossible to tell how many such cases are missing, a minimum
guess can be calculated as follows. I tried to anticipate the death-sentence cases by
finding them through database searches for each quarter before the “Death Row USA”
reports were made public. For each quarter, the database searches missed about eight
of the thirty to thirty-five death sentences—roughly 25%. It is fair to assume that the
database searches for Sentencer-Spared and Prosecutor-Spared defendants missed at
least 25% of those cases (and probably more because Death-Sentenced defendants are
more likely to generate news reports than Sentencer-Spared or Prosecutor-Spared
defendants). Using the 25% missing assumption, the searches missed about 111
Sentencer-Spared or Prosecutor-Spared defendants (25% of the combined total of 443
Sentencer-Spared and Prosecutor-Spared defendants). Adding these to the 583
defendants in the three sets, the death sentence rate falls to 20% (140/694). Of course,
the number of cases missing from the Sentencer-Spared and Prosecutor-Spared
databases could be far greater than these calculations suggest: if the database searches
missed 92%, see supra note 107, of the murder case resolutions in 2004, and a
relatively high percentage of murders in many death penalty jurisdictions are deatheligible, then there could be scores of additional case resolutions that would lower the
death-sentencing rate dramatically.
141
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Using a 2004 deathon appeal and not re-imposed.142
sentencing rate of 24%, the real death-sentencing rate after the
dust of reversals has settled years from now is likely to be
about 12%—below the 15-20% condemned by Furman.
2b. Another Perspective: “Poster Boy” Death-Sentencing
Rates
There is an alternative way of analyzing the robustness
of the death-sentencing rate. The alternative focuses on
specific kinds of defendants who have been suggested as being
particularly death-worthy—sometimes colloquially referred to
as “poster boys for the death penalty.”143 A starting point for
defining “poster boy” categories is a list proposed by Professor
Baldus: “multiple killings, defendants with prior murder
convictions, contract killings, police victim cases, extreme
torture, and sexual assaults with particular violence and
terror,”144 with some revisions to more fully account for the
most notorious types of murderers. Specifically, we will 1) sub-

142

See supra note 96 and accompanying text. See also THOMAS P. BONCZAR
TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS BULL., CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, 2003 9 (2004), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp03.pdf (reporting
that there were ninety-three appellate reversals in capital cases in 2003, the most
recent year for which data had been collected. Of these appellate reversals, fifteen
were reversals of conviction and sentence, and seventy-eight were reversals of sentence
only. Most of the conviction reversals (eleven of fifteen) were awaiting retrial, but only
twelve of the seventy-eight sentence reversals were awaiting resentencing. This means
that the other sixty-five cases were not pursued for death sentences again, and those
defendants, as the Bulletin states, “were serving a reduced sentence,” apparently due
to plea bargaining.). Additionally, in the case sample in this Article, of all the scores of
reversed sentences that must have been ripe for a resentencing proceeding in 2004,
only sixteen resentencing proceedings were found: twelve that resulted in new death
sentences, see App. D, DS 8, 16, 18, 30, 40, 45, 60, 70, 100, 118, 126, 138, and four that
did not. See App. E, SS 8, 13, 68, 112.
143
See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Another Place Beyond Here: The Death
Penalty Moratorium Movement in the United States, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 52 (2002)
(“Although the overall effect of the McVeigh execution was to create a poster boy for the
pro-death penalty movement . . . .”); Wayne A. Logan, Casting New Light on an Old
Subject: Death Penalty Abolitionism for a New Millennium, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1336,
1366 (2002) (“McVeigh, like predecessor death penalty ‘poster boys’ Eichman, Dahmer,
and Gacy, put traditional abolitionists in a difficult spot.”); Brian MacQuarrie, High
Court Clears the Way for Conn. Execution, B. GLOBE, Jan. 29, 2005, at A1 (“A former
State Police detective who cracked the case [of serial killer Michael Ross], called Ross a
‘poster boy for the death penalty.’”); Glen Puit, Killer Requests Death, Gets Life Term
from Jury, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Mar. 4, 2004, at 1B (“[Defense lawyer] Denue said his
client [Anthony Prentice, see App. E, SS 45] was ‘the poster boy for the death penalty
and [the jury] still chose life.’”).
144
See Baldus, When Symbols Clash, supra note 13, at 1605.
AND
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divide multiple murders into a) serial killings,145 b) double
murders (not serial), and c) three or more murders (not serial);
2) expand “contract killings” to include all homicides for
pecuniary gain that evidence long premeditation even if there
was no hired killer; 3) add the category of killing a victim who
is twelve years of age or younger; 4) add the category that the
defendant was a prisoner or escapee at the time of the murder;
and 5) add the category of terrorist motive. Do defendants in
these “poster boy” categories meet even the modest 33 1/3%
death-sentencing rate?
What Appendices D, E, and F reveal about these “poster
boy” categories is set forth in Chart 2 (note that the same case
can meet the criteria for more than one category):
Chart 2: Poster Boy Death-Sentencing Rates
Poster Boy
Category
Serial killer
2 victims

Total
Defs.

DS

SS

PS

11
132

5146
44149

1147
31150

5148
57151

Sentencer
Death
Rate
83%
59%

Overall
Death
Rate
45%
33%

145
There is a “lack of a standard definition of serial murder . . . . In general,
previous efforts to define serial murder have included criteria relative to the number of
victims, time elapsed between crimes, motivation, geographical mobility, and victim
selection.”
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., F.B.I. LAW
ENFORCEMENT BULL. 27 (Jan. 2005). For an extensive discussion of the various
attempts to define “serial murder,” see Edward W. Mitchell, The Aetiology of Serial
Murder: Towards an Integrated Model 3-6 (1997) (M.Phil. thesis, U. of Cambridge,
UK), available at http://users.ox.ac.uk/~zool0380/masters.htm. I will employ a twopart, popular-understanding definition: (a) multiple sexually-motivated murders or
attempted murders, separated in time, against strangers; and (b) multiple murders,
separated in time, by a health care worker. Ten cases fall into the first definition. See
App. D, DS 1, 3, 4, 5, 6; App. E, SS 3; App. F, PS 5, 14, 24, 48. One case falls into the
second definition. See App. F, PS 1.
146
See App. D, DS 1, 3, 4, 5, 6.
147
See App. E, SS 3.
148
See App. F, PS 1, 5, 14, 24, 48.
149
See App. D, DS 8, 18, 19, 22, 24, 28, 30, 31, 32, 35, 40, 41, 43, 46, 50, 52, 55,
56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 67, 68, 69, 74, 75, 79, 81, 83, 86, 91, 95, 96, 98, 100, 104, 108,
112, 115, 119, 138.
150
See App. E, SS 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 40, 44, 48,
49, 51, 54, 55, 58, 59, 60, 68, 75, 76, 77, 78, 84, 88, 102.
151
See App. F, PS 13, 14, 20, 27, 28, 29, 40, 41, 42, 43, 48, 51, 53, 57, 59, 68,
71, 72, 78, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 93, 95, 100, 104, 106, 109, 114, 115, 116, 117, 124, 126,
127, 164, 168, 171, 172, 189, 190, 207, 237, 244, 245, 251, 252, 257, 258, 259, 260, 263,
292, 299, 306.
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26152

15153

47154

63%

30%

12

155

8

156

157

1

73%

67%

45

10158

5159

30160

67%

22%

20
81
31
86
10
3

6161
25164
11167
38170
6173
1176

5162
15165
5168
16171
2174
1177

9163
41166
15169
32172
2175
1178

55%
62%
69%
70%
75%
50%

30%
31%
35%
44%
60%
33%

3

Bearing in mind that all these percentages are inflated
by the non-inclusion of cases missed by the database searches,
152
See App. D, DS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 21, 26, 29, 33, 36, 37,
38, 39, 45, 47, 64, 72, 82.
153
See App. E, SS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15, 24, 25, 29, 35.
154
See App. F, PS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 44, 45, 46, 47, 50, 52, 56, 66, 69, 75, 76,
80, 98, 101, 148.
155
See App. D, DS 36, 46, 58, 63, 67, 72, 98, 112.
156
See App. E, SS 2, 55, 76.
157
See App. F, PS 59.
158
See App. D, DS 10, 31, 50, 64, 76, 78, 89, 106, 124.
159
See App. E, SS 44, 62, 64, 86, 109.
160
See App. F, PS 16, 17, 19, 31, 46, 47, 51, 53, 62, 67, 70, 73, 74, 82, 83, 84,
99, 137, 138, 166, 167, 170, 185, 248, 249, 250, 255, 256, 262, 265.
161
See App. D, DS 39, 86, 104, 125, 139, 140.
162
See App. E, SS 1, 23, 36, 81, 103.
163
See App. F, PS 59, 108, 125, 188, 189, 269, 275, 278, 320.
164
See App. D, DS 6, 11, 15, 16, 19, 37, 38, 40, 44, 49, 50, 54, 62, 64, 71, 77, 88,
94, 96, 99, 101, 107, 113, 115, 131.
165
See App. E, SS 1, 8, 9, 11, 14, 19, 22, 32, 43, 51, 73, 91, 103, 104, 111.
166
See App. F, PS 10, 15, 18, 23, 26, 30, 34, 35, 58, 60, 71, 86, 87, 93, 95, 101,
104, 111, 131, 141, 142, 143, 180, 208, 216, 219, 221, 231, 233, 237, 267, 268, 272, 273,
280, 283, 284, 287, 291, 293, 323.
167
See App. D, DS 4, 5, 8, 15, 17, 27, 54, 62, 65, 77, 110.
168
See App. E, SS 16, 46, 47, 73, 91.
169
See App. F, PS 5, 20, 54, 55, 61, 94, 102, 131, 141, 142, 143, 153, 154, 156,
180.
170
See App. D, DS 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 25, 27, 30, 34,
40, 42, 46, 49, 51, 54, 55, 62, 65, 66, 71, 76, 77, 92, 93, 94, 101, 107, 126.
171
See App. E, SS 3, 10, 12, 14, 16, 39, 40, 43, 52, 53, 56, 61, 63, 82, 92, 93.
172
See App. F, PS 5, 14, 22, 24, 27, 32, 45, 49, 54, 55, 60, 62, 64, 65, 71, 79, 81,
94, 111, 118, 136, 156, 157, 161, 187, 201, 210, 216, 231, 236, 238, 264.
173
See App. D, DS 20, 22, 36, 43, 58, 63.
174
See App. E, SS 17, 29.
175
See App. F, PS 59, 100.
176
See App. D, DS 2.
177
See App. E, SS 1.
178
See App. F, PS 2.
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Chart 2 nonetheless illustrates a robust sentencer death rate of
at least 33 1/3% in all eleven “poster boy” categories. The
overall death rate figures after including Prosecutor-Spared
defendants, however, are robust in only seven categories;
further, three of those categories barely achieve robust levels
(exactly 33 1/3% for “2 victims,” 35% for “Torture,” and exactly
33 1/3% for “Terrorist motive”). Two other categories, although
exhibiting robust death-sentencing rates, are not as high as one
would expect from “poster boys”: particularly startling is the
mere 45% overall death rate for “Serial killers,” the most
“poster-boyish” of the “poster boys.” Also remarkable in its
modest overall death rate is the 44% for “Sexual assault”
defendants. And perhaps most surprising are four categories
that fail to achieve an overall robust death sentencing rate:
30% for “3 or more victims” (three percentage points lower than
for “2 victims”), 22% for “Pecuniary premeditation,” and 30%
for “Police victim.” Indeed, the only two categories with really
robust rates are 67% for “Prior murder conviction,” and 60% for
“Prisoner/escapee” (both of which have a limited number of
defendants).
In summary, Chart 1 illustrates that the overall deathsentencing rate of 24% hardly qualifies as robust among all the
583 death-eligible defendants; Chart 2 illustrates that this lack
of robustness is not uncommon even among the intuitively
most depraved, “poster boy” defendants.
3. Does the Death-Sentencing Rate Increase with
Aggravation Level?
Recall that Chart 1 is as follows:
Chart 1: Death-Sentencing Rates by Depravity Point Level
Depravity
Points
30+
20-29
15-19
10-14
7-9
3w-6
2-5 no3w
Total

Total
Defs.
23
41
64
128
139
71
117
583

DS

SS

PS

12
16
28
41
26
5
12
140

2
9
10
29
29
17
24
120

9
16
26
58
84
49
81
323

Sentencer
Death Rate
86%
64%
74%
59%
47%
23%
33%
54%

Overall
Death Rate
52%
39%
44%
32%
19%
7%
10%
24%

Chart 1 demonstrates that the death-sentencing rate
does increase overall with aggravation level, but not in an
entirely linear fashion. The death-sentencing rates at the two
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lowest depravity levels are certainly significantly lower than at
the higher levels. But the rates at the two lowest levels are
reversed from what a non-arbitrary system would project: the
rate with sentencers in the non-death-eligible 2-5no3w category
is 33%, compared with 23% for death-eligible 3w-6 defendants,
and the overall rates in those categories are 10% and 7%,
respectively. Moving to the higher levels, there is an expected
progression moving from 7-9 to 10-14 to 15-19: 47% to 59% to
74% with sentencers, and 19% to 32% to 44% overall. The
progression falters, however, at two of the upper levels. With
sentencers, the rate in the 20-29 category is 10 percentage
points less than in the 15-19 category (64% vs. 74%).179
Arguably, the increase in death-sentencing rate with
aggravation level is close enough to what rationality would
suggest that the current system should not be deemed
arbitrary on this basis alone; but neither does this data present
a compelling case for non-arbitrariness.
4. Are the Reasons for Sparing Defendants from Death
Sentences Merits-Based?
a. Sentencer Reasons
There are too few indications in the news reports about
why sentencers (almost always juries) spared defendants to
draw any empirical conclusions based on what jurors said after
the fact. Jurors mostly remained mum about why they spared
defendants; and even when the occasional juror gave a reason
to the press, there is no guarantee that the juror was stating
179
There is an alternative way to view these statistics that could refute the
contention that the death-sentencing rate should rise as the depravity point level goes
up. It could be argued that the figures show that juries “max out” in their feelings
about how depraved a defendant is at about depravity point level 7; that is, that a
defendant with a depravity point level of 7 already seems to jurors to be so bad that
they are simply unable to feel that a higher level of depravity points makes a defendant
significantly more death-worthy. If we imagine a ten-point scale of death-worthiness,
with 10 as highest, then a 7-depravity-point defendant rates about a 9.5 for most
jurors, leaving little room for increasing levels of death-sentencing as the depravity
point level goes up even further. But even if this is true, it has only marginal effects in
making the figures in Chart 1 seem less arbitrary: the “Overall death rate” among the
390 defendants with 7 or more depravity points is 36% (140/390), still less robust than
one would expect from a non-arbitrary system among the very worst defendants (and
recall that the actual rate is less than 36% because of cases missing from the
Sentencer-Spared and Prosecutor-Spared categories). Further, Chart 2 for death
penalty “poster boys” changes little, because virtually every one of these defendants
accrued 7 or more depravity points, yet the “Overall Death Rate[s]” within the
subcategories are all over the board.
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something with which the other jurors would agree. Thus, as is
true with most jury outcomes, we can judge performance
almost exclusively by the results.
There is, however, one factor that can be characterized
as regularly recurring: deadlocked juries.180 In almost every
jury-sentencing jurisdiction, the vote for death must be
unanimous, and if it is not, the sentence defaults to a nondeath sentence.181 Whether deadlocks result from the holdouts’
views of the merits is impossible to determine. Another
distinct possibility is that holdouts think they can return a
death verdict during jury selection, but find that they cannot
do so when actually faced with the prospect of imposing a death
sentence, even if on the merits they think a death sentence is
warranted.182
Of course, the unanimity requirement furthers the goal
of imposing death sentences on only the “worst of the worst,”
because if all twelve jurors can be convinced, one would hope
the defendant falls into the “worst of the worst” category.183
But the unanimity rule simultaneously arbitrarily spares some
of the “worst of the worst” from death sentences—it works as a
one-way ratchet of leniency placed in the hands of a small
minority of jurors. It seems likely that defendants who avoid
death sentences because the jury deadlocks eleven to one or ten
to two for death have been spared not because they were not
among the “worst of the worst,” but because they are among
180
Of the 120 Sentencer-Spared cases, in eighteen Florida cases, eight
Delaware cases, and one Alabama case, there could not be a deadlock because the
jurors merely tallied their votes and reported their tally as a recommendation to the
judge, who imposed the sentence (giving great deference to the jury’s recommendation).
Of the remaining 93 cases, juries were deadlocked as to twenty-four defendants, see
App. E, SS 1, 2, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 33, 34, 37, 38, 43, 53, 64, 65, 74, 77, 88, 91, 93, 97,
100, 111, 118, or about one-quarter of the time. This undoubtedly understates the
proportion of deadlocked juries, because one suspects that, relatively often, a jury was
non-unanimous, but may have nonetheless reported a unanimous verdict for a nondeath sentence in order to resolve the case.
181
See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
182
See, e.g., Misti Crane, Killer of 3 Escapes Death Sentence, THE COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, July 24, 2005, at 01C. (“But while they were considering the death penalty,
some argued that life in prison would be a stiffer punishment, and one said that he or
she simply could not sign off on the death penalty.”); Jury Prayed about Nielsen,
DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt Lake City, UT), Feb. 6, 2004, at B03 (quoting jury
member in Cody Nielsen case, see App. E, SS 12, “The one person who wanted life
without parole made a statement that they knew in their head that the death penalty
was appropriate, but in their heart they couldn’t do it.”).
183
There are twelve defendants in 2004 for whom this hope was in vain. See
supra at notes 136-39 and accompanying text, setting forth the twelve 2004 deathsentenced defendants who were not death-worthy according to the Depravity Point
Calculator based on the information available in the news reports.
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the “luckiest of the lucky” to have gotten a stubborn,
aberrational juror or two on their panels.184 Among the 120
Sentencer-Spared Defendants, at least eight of them were
spared death sentences because the jury deadlocked eleven to
one or ten to two for death.185 Further, this was likely true in
additional cases, because there were eight reported deadlocks
without reports of how many jurors were on each side.186
Further, one suspects that there were additional cases where
juries reported back unanimous non-death verdicts when the
jury was irrevocably deadlocked due to one or two anti-death
holdouts, and the pro-death jurors gave in so that a verdict
could be returned.
b. Prosecutorial Reasons
According to the information in the news reports,
prosecutors did not pursue death sentences in death-eligible
cases for both merits-based and non-merits based reasons.
This section describes reasons prosecutors did not pursue death
sentences in death-eligible cases, as gleaned from news reports
and organized by category.
The first category of merits-based reasons is
“Guilt/innocence”: the prosecutor believed there were
significant obstacles to proving the defendant’s guilt. This
category is subdivided into four sub-categories: 1) generic
“Evidence questionable”; 2) a specific problem of questionable
evidence due to “Multiple perpetrators,” which often makes it
difficult to prove the degree of culpability of a particular
184
There were eight such reported deadlocks. See App. E, SS 2 (10-2), SS 14
(10-2), SS 17 (11-1), SS 18 (11-1), SS 20 (10-2), SS 65 (10-2), SS 93 (10-2), and SS 111
(11-1). The jury performs a distinctly different function in capital sentencing than in
normal guilt or non-guilt determinations. Requiring unanimity for guilt certainly
furthers the system’s goal of minimizing wrongful convictions. But in capital
sentencing, the goal should not be minimizing death sentences, but imposing death
sentences on only, and a robust proportion of, the “worst of the worst,” without
excluding the “worst of the worst” for non-merits-based reasons. As the Court has
noted, the jury’s function in capital sentencing is to act as “the conscience of the
community.” See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 382 (1999) (approving strong
governmental interest in having a jury express conscience of community in deathsentencing determinations). If a jury is split eleven to one or ten to two for death, who
is more representatively expressing the “conscience of the community”: the eleven and
ten, or the one and two? Even votes of nine to three and eight to four for death show
that the conscience of the community strongly favors death. It is only when the vote
reaches seven jurors or fewer for death that there seems to be a substantial case for the
conscience of the community not favoring death.
185
See App. E, SS 2, 14, 17, 18, 20, 65, 93, 111.
186
See App. E, SS 43, 33, 64, 74, 88, 91, 97, 118.
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perpetrator; 3) a specific resolution of the uncertainty in a
multiple perpetrator case through “Deal given for testimony” to
one of the perpetrators; and 4) “Prior hung jury,” which relates
to perceived weakness in the evidence indicated by a prior
deadlocked jury at the guilt/innocence phase of the defendant’s
or a co-perpetrator’s trial.
The second category of merits-based reasons is “Penalty
Phase”: the prosecutor believed that the potential mitigating
evidence was so strong that the chances of getting a death
sentence were not good. The sub-categories here are: 1) the
defendant was “Not aggravated enough”; 2) a generic belief
that the “Mitigation [was] significant,” followed by a list of
these specific types of mitigation: 3) “Mental problems”; 4)
“Intoxication”; 5) “Rotten background”; 6) “Youthful age”; 7)
“Older age/bad health”; 8) “No prior record”; and finally 9) that
a “Prior hung jury” at the penalty phase of the defendant’s or a
co-perpetrator’s trial gave reason to doubt a successful death
sentence outcome.
The third category pertains to non-merits—and
therefore arbitrary—reasons prosecutors forego death
sentences. The first is “Victim’s relatives’ wishes.” The news
reports show that relatives’ wishes fell into one of three
patterns: relatives were 1) zealous for a death sentence; 2)
primarily wanted the case resolved, whatever the sentence; and
3) did not want a death sentence. These wishes represent an
arbitrary factor because they do not relate to the aggravation
or mitigation in a case. It is entirely unpredictable which
pattern will prevail, and sometimes the relatives are not all of
one mind, particularly if there is more than one set of relatives
because there were multiple victims.
The second non-merits reason relates to the age of the
case. When a “case is old,” it is usually because of an appellate
reversal or several, although sometimes the age of the case is
due to a long delay in solving the case or to very long pre-trial
maneuvering.
In theory, the age of the case could be
considered a merits-based reason, because evidence can become
unavailable or less powerful over time. But given that most of
these cases are old due to appellate reversals, there is no
technical evidentiary problem because the new sentencer will
be instructed that the finding of guilt should be taken as a
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given,187 and the aggravation for penalty-phase purposes is
either inherent in the finding of guilt or can be proven by
reconstituted evidence.188 Further, the very fact that reversible
error was committed when the case was litigated earlier is
arbitrary in and of itself.
The third non-merits reason for a prosecutor to forego a
death sentence is that it would be too costly for the county to
prosecute a death penalty case. A death penalty case costs
much more than the same case litigated as a non-death-penalty
case, both in dollar costs, and in the drain on person-power
from the prosecutor’s staff.189 Some counties simply cannot
afford to prosecute a death penalty case, while other counties
can afford the tab (at least for some of their death-eligible
cases).190 The ability of the county to pay for such a case is as
arbitrary as a factor can be.
187
See David McCord, Switching Juries in Midstream: The Perplexities of
Penalty-Phase-Only Retrials, 2 OH. ST. J. CRIM. L. 215, 232 n.27 (2004) (setting forth
precedents).
188
Id. at 233-40 (explaining law).
189
See Charles S. Lanier & James R. Acker, Capital Punishment, the
Moratorium Movement, and Empirical Questions, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 577,
588 (2004), suggesting that:

[C]apital trials in California are six times more expensive to conduct than
other murder trials, and that taxpayers in that state could save $90 million a
year by abolishing the death penalty. Capital trials are so taxing on county
budgets that they have brought some localities to the verge of bankruptcy.
There are many reasons why capital punishment is so costly. . . . Both the
prosecution and defense must prepare for two hearings in capital cases—the
guilt-innocence trial and then a separate penalty hearing. Readying for dual
proceedings compounds the investigation time, the number of experts
consulted, and attorneys’ preparation time. Many jurisdictions require the
appointment of two defense attorneys for capital trials. Jury selection is
especially protracted in capital cases, as voir dire is extended because jurors
must be “death qualified” before being impaneled. Individualized voir dire
also is required in some jurisdictions. If a capital conviction is secured, the
penalty trial involves the presentation of new evidence and arguments and
can be quite time-consuming. (citations omitted).
See also Theodore Eisenberg, Death Sentenced Rates and County Demographics: An
Empirical Study, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 347, 358 (2005) (“[T]he legal system [has] limited
capacity to process capital cases. Researchers suggest that the expense of capital cases
and other factors limit the absolute number of death sentence cases a jurisdiction can
prosecute. . . . At the margin, therefore, the prosecution of one capital case likely
preclude[s] the prosecution of another.”). See id. at n.40, (citing a news report that
Harris County, Texas (Houston), tries an abnormally high number of capital cases per
year owing to a thirty-million dollar budget).
190
Apropos of the citation in the preceding footnote, top-level prosecutor Lyn
McClellan in Harris County said: “[W]hy are the other counties in Texas not seeking
the death penalty as often [as Harris County]? It is likely economic reasons. Smaller
counties have to make decisions based on their budgets. We do not have to make those
decisions based on economics in Harris County.” McCord, Switching Juries, supra note
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A prosecutor may also forego a death sentence in
exchange for the defendant’s revealing information about
either the identity of the victims or location of the bodies. This
reason is not only non-merits based and completely arbitrary, it
is perverse. It rewards a defendant with a non-death sentence
for having killed additional victims or having carefully hidden
the bodies.191
The fifth non-merits reason for a prosecutor to forego a
death sentence is that the prosecutor had to waive the
possibility of seeking death in exchange for extradition of the
defendant from an anti-death-penalty foreign country. There
are many countries where this is a necessary condition for
extradition.192 The 2004 defendants included three for whom
an agreement was necessary to obtain extradition from
5, at 258. In the Prosecutor-Spared cases in Appendix F, however, it was rare to catch
prosecutors acknowledging that they bargain away a death sentence for cost reasons—
only two prosecutors made such statements. See John Tuohy, Suspect in Muncie
Slaying Won’t Face Death Penalty, THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 22, 2004, at 1B (“‘We
wanted it to be resolved fast for the family,’ [prosecutor Judi] Calhoun said. ‘Death
penalty cases are expensive and time-consuming.’” [referring to PS 217 in App. F]);
Jessica Brown, West Gets 2 Life Terms, No Parole, CINCINNATI POST, Aug. 24, 2004, at
A (“The defense and prosecution said the plea agreement also spared the victims the
trauma of a trial and saved the taxpayers thousands of dollars.” [referring to PS 110 in
App. F]). See also Ashley Rupp, Note, Death Penalty Prosecutorial Charging Decisions
and County Budgetary Restrictions: Is the Death Penalty Arbitrarily Applied Based on
County Funding?, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2735 (2003) (noting funding disparities, and
arguing that they may undermine the constitutionality of capital punishment).
191
One cannot let pass the opportunity to mention here a defendant who
barely missed being in the 2004 database: “Green River” serial murderer Gary Leon
Ridgway. Ridgway admitted to killing forty-eight women in the Seattle area. He was
spared a death sentence by the King County prosecutor’s office in exchange for helping
to locate some of his victims’ bodies. Ridgway was sentenced in December 2003 to
forty-eight terms of life-without-parole. See Gene Johnson, Ridgway Says He’s Sorry
for Killings, THE COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, WA), Dec. 19, 2003, at A1. Another
appalling set of murders out of which no death sentences resulted that barely missed
qualifying for the 2004 database was the federal prosecution of gang members in
“Murder, Inc.” in the District of Columbia. The gang was responsible for at least
thirty-one murders over about a decade in an attempt to corner the illegal drug market
in areas of the District. Death sentences were sought for the two kingpins, Kevin Gray
and Rodney Moore, but the jury deadlocked in 2003 at the penalty phase. See Neely
Tucker, D.C. Killers Get Life after Stalemate on Death Penalty, THE WASH. POST, Mar.
14, 2003, at B01. Six other members of the gang were convicted in 2004, but the
prosecutorial decisions not to seek death sentences against them apparently had been
made before 2004, so they were not eligible to be included in this article’s database.
See Carol D. Leonnig, Trial of D.C. Drug Gang Ends with Six Convicted, THE WASH.
POST, May 11, 2004, at B03.
192
For discussion, see Michael J. Kelly, Cheating Justice by Cheating Death:
The Doctrinal Collision for Prosecuting Foreign Terrorists—Passage of Aut Dedere Aut
Judicare into Customary Law and Refusal to Extradite Based on the Death Penalty, 20
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 491, 508 (2003); James Finsten, Note, Extradition or
Execution? Policy Constraints in the United States’ War on Terror, 77 S. CAL. L. REV.
835, 837-39 (2004).
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Canada,193 and three from Mexico.194 This is an arbitrary factor
because it makes the defendant’s death eligibility turn on
whether he can get across the border before being arrested.195
The sixth non-merits reason for a prosecutor’s not
seeking a death sentence is that the prosecutor is personally
It is
philosophically opposed to capital punishment.196
completely arbitrary whether a defendant happens to commit a
death-eligible crime in a county where he is effectively immune
from a death sentence due to the prosecutor’s personal
ideological stance.
The seventh non-merits reason for foregoing a death
sentence is a prosecutor’s belief that it will be fruitless to try to
obtain a death sentence because even if the prosecutor is
successful, the state’s supreme court is so philosophically
opposed to capital punishment that it will never permit an
execution.197 This belief may be entirely rational, but the effect
193

See App. F, PS 46, 47, 300.
See App. F, PS 105, 168, 253. For reporting on the problems of extraditing
death-eligible defendants from Mexico, see Irene Hsiao & David L. Teibel, Slaying
Suspects Taking Refuge in Mexico, TUCSON CITIZEN, May 5, 2004, at A1 (detailing
frustrations of U.S. authorities with attempts to extradite suspected criminals from
Mexico); Jeff Proctor, Criminals Can’t Hide, ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 26, 2004, at B1
(explaining that extradition is becoming more common, but is still not easy).
195
For example, compare the three defendants in the preceding footnote, who
made it across the border into Canada before being arrested, and who were only
extradited after American prosecutors agreed not to seek a death sentence, with DS 93
in App. D, where the defendant was arrested on the American side of the border and
ultimately sentenced to death.
196
The sample provides only one case in which a prosecutor publicly stated
that she would not seek a death sentence because she was philosophically opposed to
capital punishment. See Harriet Chiang, D.A. Defends Decision Not to Seek Execution;
Her Position has been Clear Since Campaign, She Says, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 25, 2004, at
B1 (“‘I have been very clear about not seeking the death penalty,’ [Kamala] Harris said,
reminding others of the campaign pledge that she made.” [referring to PS 125 in App.
F]). Local variations based on prosecutors’ ideas about the moral acceptability of
capital punishment are well known. See, e.g., John Gleeson, Supervising Federal
Capital Punishment: Why the Attorney General Should Defer When U.S. Attorneys
Recommend Against the Death Penalty, 89 VA. L. REV. 1697, 1718 (2003):
194

Within New York State, where the district attorneys are elected, some
district attorneys, particularly in New York City, rarely or never seek the
death penalty despite numerous death-eligible cases. Some district attorneys
in upstate counties seek it often. . . . On the same set of facts, the District
Attorney in Monroe County in upstate New York will be far more confident
that the death penalty is appropriate—and that the jury will impose it—than
the District Attorney in the Bronx, who has never sought the death penalty
and has publicly stated that he never will.
197
Prosecutors in four cases in the sample had the temerity to make such
statements about appellate courts, although two of the four were oblique references.
See Keith Herbert, Man, 25, Makes Deal in Murder; He was Obsessed with his Coworker, Authorities Said. By Pleading Guilty in the ‘02 Case, He Avoids the Death
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is arbitrary—the defendant’s death-eligibility turns not on the
merits of the case, but on a judicial attitude of disapproval
toward a legitimate state law (or a prosecutor’s perception of
that attitude).
The final non-merits reason for a prosecutor not to
pursue a death sentence is the prosecutor’s belief that juries in
the jurisdiction are death-averse, and that it will likely be
fruitless to try for a death sentence.198 This could conceivably
be characterized as a merits-based reason that simply
recognizes legitimate local variation in appetites for death
sentences. But there are two responsive arguments: 1) local
variation is not a virtue to be cherished when it results in
arbitrary imposition or non-imposition of death sentences;199
and 2) prosecutors do not think they can impanel a jury that
will unanimously vote for death—the problems of arbitrariness
when even one juror can veto a death sentence have already
been discussed.200
In the expanded Appendix F,201 after each ProsecutorSpared defendant is a grid identifying the discernable reasons
(if any) a prosecutor did not pursue a death sentence. A reason
stated by a prosecutor is indicated by an “s,” and a reason not
Penalty, PHIL. INQUIRER, July 27, 2004, at B01 (“The death penalty isn’t carried out in
Pennsylvania as often as in Texas or Virginia, which was another factor in accepting
Vample’s plea, [prosecutor Kevin] Steele said.” [referring to PS 161 in App. F]); Jim
O’Neill, Man, 21, Admits Killing his Uncle, 59, Avoids Death Penalty by Pleading
Guilty, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Jan. 14, 2004, at 29 (“‘In all likelihood, the [state]
Supreme Court will never allow anyone to be executed in New Jersey,” said prosecutor
Thomas Kapsak. [referring to PS 102 in App. F]); Byron Rohrig, Man Pleads Guilty in
Librarian’s Death, EVANSVILLE COURIER PRESS (Ind.), Nov. 2, 2004, at A5 (“Posey
County Prosecutor Jodi Uebelhack announced she wouldn’t pursue the death penalty.
‘If there was some guarantee he’d actually get executed if sentenced to the death
penalty, maybe it would make it worth it.’” [referring to PS 49 in App. F]); Michelle
Sahn, Prosecutor:
Justices Won’t Abide Punishment; Defense Wins Ruling on
Testimony. Second Death Penalty Falls; State Supreme Court Upholds Conviction,
HOME NEWS TRIB. (N.J.), Mar. 26, 2004, at A1 (Prosecutor Thomas Kapsak again: “No
matter how heinous the crime, this [state] Supreme Court will never allow a defendant
to receive the maximum penalty provided by law. . . .” [referring to PS 170 in App. F]).
198
A prosecutor made such a statement in only one case in the sample. See
Tuohy, supra note 190 (“‘With the tenor of juries these days, I think they are less likely
to enforce death penalties,’ [the prosecutor] said.” [referring to PS 217 in App. F]).
199
For a well-argued rendition of the argument that many variations in
death-sentencing ratios are legitimate products of local sentiments, as reflected by the
decisions of local prosecutors, see Gleeson, supra note 196, at 1713-15 (“U.S. Attorneys
know the strengths and weaknesses of their cases, the likelihood that juries will
convict, the particular resource allocation issues in their districts, and how the
communities they serve and protect perceive crimes and evaluate punishments.”). This
argument has similar force as to county attorneys within a state system.
200
See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
201
Uncondensed Appendices, supra note 103, at App. F.
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stated but reasonably inferable is indicated by an “i.” The
summaries of prosecutorial reasons, below, will focus on the
stated reasons.
Prosecutors were rather close-mouthed to the press
about their reasons for foregoing death sentences. Prosecutors
stated reasons as to only less than one-third of the ProsecutorSpared202 defendants (94/323 (although sometimes they stated
more than one reason). In fifteen additional defendants’ cases,
prosecutors’ giving one defendant in a multiple perpetrator
case a deal in exchange for testimony against one of the other
perpetrators was tantamount to a statement of a reason; and in
another six defendants’ cases, prosecutors were obliged to
waive death- sentencing in return for an agreement by
Canadian or Mexican authorities to extradite the defendants.
Thus, as to less than half of the Prosecutor-Spared cases
(115/323) there are prosecutorial reasons on record explaining
why a death sentence was not pursued. Here is Chart 3, which
presents a summary of the stated reasons prosecutors spared
those 115 defendants (the reasons total more than 115 because
sometimes prosecutors state multiple reasons):
Chart 3: Prosecutorial Reasons for Not Pursuing Death Sentence
Guilt/Innocence
Evidence questionable
Multiple perpetrators
Deal given for testimony
Prior hung jury, etc.
Penalty phase
Not aggravated enough
Mitigation significant
Mental problems
Intoxication
Rotten background
Youthful age
Older age
No prior record
Prior hung jury, etc.
Non-merits
Victim’s relatives’ wishes
Case is old
Cost
Defendant to name other victims
Waiver for extradition

12
15
15

3
3
7
2
5
2
6

38
5
3
5
6

202
Usually a prosecutor spares a defendant through a plea bargain, but
occasionally the prosecutor announces the intent not to pursue a death sentence even
without a plea bargain.
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Prosecutor doubts appellate
Prosecutor doubts juries
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1
4
2

Chart 3 shows almost an equal number of merits-based
and non-merits-based reasons: seventy to sixty-four. Thus,
almost half the reasons on record for not pursuing death
sentences were unrelated to the merits of the cases.
Of particular significance is that the single most-cited
reason, by far, was the non-merits-based “Victims’ relatives
wishes.” This is disturbing enough in itself, but there is
something deeper buried here.
Even though “Cost,”
“Prosecutor doubts appellate [courts],” and “Prosecutor doubts
juries” were rarely mentioned, from a real-world standpoint
there is surely a close, unstated connection among these four
reasons. There must certainly be cases involving the costminded, gun-shy prosecutor who persuades/manipulates/hides
behind the victim’s relatives. One may imagine a prosecutor’s
thought process: “This is a terrible crime, one that really ought
to be pursued as a death penalty case. But my office’s budget
can’t afford it, nor can we spare the lawyer and staff resources
to do it right. Even if we pursue a death sentence, there’s a
good chance of ending up with at least one hold-out juror. And
even if we get a death sentence, our state supreme court is
eager to find any reason to overturn a death sentence (or if the
state supreme court doesn’t, some federal court probably will
during the habeas corpus litigation)—then the case will be
right back in our laps again, looking like we bungled it the first
time. Now, if I explain all this to the victim’s relatives, and
exert a little pressure by playing up how long they will be in
limbo, they might agree to a non-death plea. Then I can look
honorable in the media by saying that I bargained the case out
of consideration for the victim’s relatives.”
This line of
reasoning spares defendants from death sentences for a
potpourri of non-merits reasons.
Appendix G sets forth a summary of the reasons
prosecutors do not pursue death sentences that can be inferred
from the news reports, even though prosecutors did not state
them as reasons. Appendix G illustrates that the two most
common inferable reasons for prosecutors to forego pursuing
death sentences are the evidentiary problems presented by
multiple perpetrators (a merits-based factor), and the age of
the cases (usually a non-merits-based factor). The remainder
of the reasons primarily relate to human frailty mitigation
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that, as discussed above, is indistinguishable as between
evidence from Death-Sentenced and Sentencer-Spared cases.
H. A Summary Based on the Empirical Data: An Inference of
an Arbitrary System
The analysis of the news reports raises a strong
inference that the death penalty system fails the four-part
litmus test for non-arbitrariness: the system may persist in
over-including defendants who are not among the “worst of the
worst” murderers, does not generate sufficiently robust deathsentencing rates among the “worst of the worst,” does not
produce a death sentencing rate that increases entirely
predictably with the aggravation level of the offenses, and does
not assure merits-based reasons for defendants being spared
death sentences. Here are some facts to ponder that support
this inference:
Death sentences were imposed on fewer than half (28/64) of the
defendants who accrued 20 or more depravity points—murderers
who were so ridiculously or enormously aggravated that it boggles
the mind;
272 murderers who did not receive death sentences were more
depraved than the 17 least depraved defendants who did;
159 murderers who did not receive death sentences were more
depraved than about the bottom one-third of those who did (43);
Terrorist bomber Terry Nichols, convicted of killing 161 people, was
spared a death sentence by a jury, probably because he “found Jesus”
in the Bible Belt;203 serial killers Charles Cullen and Richard White
were spared death sentences by prosecutors in return for identifying
their victims or the whereabouts of their remains;204 yet Cory Maye,
who was minding his own business in his bedroom when the police
launched a raid and he shot one of them with a bullet that just
missed hitting the officer’s bulletproof vest, was death-sentenced by
a jury.205

A system that produces such arbitrary results should be
subject to serious attack under a renewed Furman analysis.
Echoing Justice White in Furman, there is a strong inference
that in the existing system: “[T]he death penalty is exacted
with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes
and . . . there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
203
204
205

See App. E, SS 1.
See App. F, PS 1, 5.
See App. D, DS 140.
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cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is
not.”206 It seems likely that death penalty lightning has been
striking ever since Furman.
III. DOES THIS ARGUMENT HAVE ANY PROSPECT OF SUCCESS?
From a practical litigation standpoint, there is a
maddening conundrum in trying to invoke Furman’s
nationwide outcomes holding: only the U. S. Supreme Court is
in a position to utilize it, yet an issue can only arrive at the
Court after being properly presented during lower court
proceedings. Let’s imagine litigation scenarios for trying to
raise a renewed Furman challenge, first through a state
system, and then through the federal system.
A. Practical Challenges
Through a state system: To concretely illustrate the
conundrum, imagine a death-eligible litigant—let’s call him
Doe—who is charged in a particular state—let’s say
Pennsylvania. Suppose Doe’s attorney wants to make a
Furman-based Eighth Amendment challenge. Doe’s attorney
cannot argue to a Pennsylvania court that the nationwide
death penalty system should be declared unconstitutional for
arbitrariness. A Pennsylvania court has no power to make
rulings about the constitutionality of any other jurisdiction’s
death penalty system. Pennsylvania courts would properly
insist on evidence that Pennsylvania’s system is operating
arbitrarily. At most, a Pennsylvania court might be willing to
consider nationwide evidence as secondary support for a
finding of arbitrariness in the Pennsylvania system.
Through the federal system: A federal habeas challenge
to a state death sentence cannot accommodate a nationwide
Furman challenge. Imagine that Doe failed in his challenge to
the Pennsylvania system and has now filed a habeas petition in
federal court in Pennsylvania. Under prevailing rules, only
issues that were raised in state court proceedings can be
litigated in a federal habeas proceeding.207 As we just saw, Doe
could not effectively raise a nationwide arbitrariness challenge
206

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977) (establishing that, in
order for a claim not to be waived for purposes of federal habeas review, the applicant
must have litigated it correctly in state system, subject to very narrow exception).
207
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in the Pennsylvania courts. Neither can a federal death
penalty defendant effectively raise a renewed Furman
challenge. Imagine litigant Roe, who is battling the prospect of
a death sentence in federal court. Roe is in no different
position than Doe: Roe can only challenge the constitutionality
of the system in which he is charged—in his case, the federal
death penalty system.
B. A Potentially Workable Challenge
Is there no prospect, then, of ever successfully raising,
let alone prevailing on, a renewed Furman challenge? While
hope is slim, it is not nonexistent. Here is a possible scenario.
First, the best states in which to raise the challenge should be
determined by a legal strategy team. The best states would
have the following combination of factors: a bad factual record
for arbitrary results,208 a state supreme court that is skeptical
of capital punishment, and, as a fallback in case certiorari is
not granted on direct review, at least one federal district court
habeas judge who is likewise skeptical. Since the argument
will have to focus on the specific state system, relying on news
report data from one year would not be ideal—preferably, data
from several prior years would be unearthed and analyzed
using the Baldus technique. Once the argument is crafted at
its best, death penalty defense lawyers with cases in the early
stages of litigation should be recruited to file a pre-trial motion
arguing that the state’s death penalty system is
unconstitutional on a renewed Furman basis. Eventually, at
208
Pennsylvania would be a good candidate. That state had thirty-eight
defendants in the database. As to the eleven most depraved defendants, Pennsylvania
had two death sentences (in App. D, DS 21 (23 points) and DS 38 (17 points)); three
spared by sentencers (in App. E, SS 7 (24 points), SS 33 (12 points), and SS 38 (12
points)); and six spared by prosecutors (in App. F, PS 1 (198 points), PS 11 (26 points),
PS 12 (26 points), PS 23 (20 points), PS 44 (16 points), and PS 45 (15 points)). Thus,
the four most depraved defendants escaped death sentences, as did six of the top eight,
and nine of the top eleven. On the other hand, two of the five death sentences (DS 137
(4 points) and DS 138 (3 points)), were not death-eligible according to the Depravity
Point Calculator (see supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text). Ohio would be
another good candidate. A great deal of data is available about the Ohio system due to
a massive study of statewide murder cases over a twenty-year period from 1981-2002
undertaken by the Associated Press under the direction of reporter Andrew WelshHuggins. For reports of the results of this effort, see Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Killers
Avoid Death Penalty, CINCINNATI POST, June 6, 2005, at A1 (noting seemingly
irrational disparities based on number of victims and other factors); Andrew WelshHuggins, Death Row Odds Vary, AKRON BEACON J., May 7, 2005, at A1 (detailing
seeming anomalies throughout the state where some defendants who avoided death
sentences looked worse than some defendants who received death sentences).
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least one of those defendants would be sentenced to death, and
would be able to litigate the issue in a state appeal and in a
federal habeas proceeding. This, in turn, could lead to a
successful certiorari petition to the Court.
Envision now that the Court has chosen to review this
issue—what could allow a renewed Furman argument to
prevail? Resorting to the catch phrase from an old movie, at
least five members of the Court would have to feel like
screaming about the death penalty: “I’m mad as hell, and I’m
not going to take it anymore!”209 That was the mindset of the
five Justices in the majority in Furman—they had seen enough
of the arbitrary operation of the death penalty over the years
that they were willing to abandon their usual case-by-case,
issue-by-issue approach, and stop the whole system in its
tracks. And that was the position at which Justice Blackmun
later arrived.210 While there is no explicit indication that five
209
This is the catchphrase from the 1976 Academy Award nominated film
“Network,” originally uttered by the character of disillusioned news broadcaster
Howard Beale (played by Peter Finch) that becomes a national slogan. It ranks as
number nineteen in a list of the 100 greatest movie lines in a recent poll by the
American Film Institute. American Film Institute, AFI’s 100 Years. . . 100 Movie
Quotes, http://www.afi.com/tvevents/100years/quotes.aspx#list (last visited Jan. 28,
2006). A version of this slogan could be inferred from the following comment in a state
bar publication about the Oregon death penalty system:

By keeping the death penalty in Oregon we show that we continue to be
“tough on crime,” but on whom are we tough? Certainly not the worst. We
will kill the junkie who happens to murder a person who didn’t pay his “bills”;
a person high on methamphetamine who killed a hitchhiker he picked up; a
drunken person who killed someone chasing him. But, we can’t kill a man
who sawed seven women to death, another who killed his family, or one who
sexually assaulted and then murdered two of his own daughter’s friends and
then conducted media interviews on the slab under which one was buried.
Maintaining the Oregon death penalty in the face of these new realities is the
acme of hypocrisy.
William R. Long, The Odyssey of Oregon’s Death Penalty, 65 OR. ST. B. BULL 70 (Nov.
2004). See also Editorial, Death Penalty in N.J. is a Farce, OCEAN COUNTY OBSERVER
(Toms River, N.J.), Apr. 11, 2004, at A16 (“It is a farce, mere show, New Jersey’s death
penalty law. . . . No one, least of all [death-sentenced killer Robert Marshall, whose
death sentence was reversed twenty-two years after the crime] believes he or anyone
else will be executed for murder in New Jersey.”); Five Murders, Life Term; So Scrap
Death Penalty, PALM BEACH POST, Dec. 16, 2004, at 22A (“If anyone deserved the death
penalty, it was Michael Roman. He killed five members of a Lake Worth family two
years ago. The murders were calculated. One victim was a pregnant woman. Even
after all this time, he shows no remorse. . . . [Prosecutor] Krischer says this case is
‘unique.’ But when a pro-death penalty prosecutor who says he doesn’t use the
punishment as a bargaining chip is satisfied to sign off on a deal that spares the life of
a mass murderer, those ‘unique’ circumstances indict every death case in Florida.”).
210
Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(“Rather than continue to coddle the Court’s delusion that the desired level of fairness
[in administering the death penalty] has been achieved and the need for regulation
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current Justices have lost their stomach for the existing system
of capital punishment, there are some indications that
majorities of the Court have not been thrilled in recent years
with some aspects of the system’s operation.211
The difficulty in inducing the Court to declare the
existing system unconstitutionally arbitrary, however, should
not be underestimated. The Furman Court had no hand in
creating the pre-Furman system, and did not have to admit
any mistakes of its own in overturning that system. By
contrast, the current Court and its predecessors going back to
Furman have played a large role (along with state legislatures
and lower courts) in creating the current system. If it were to
rule the current system unconstitutional, the Court would have
to acknowledge that much of its capital jurisprudence over the
last three decades has been a colossal mistake.212 While it
eviscerated, I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death
penalty experiment has failed.”). Justice Scalia also thinks the existing system of
capital punishment is arbitrary. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 664 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that to speak of guided discretion and individualized
sentencing is “rather like referring to the twin objectives of good and evil”). Justice
Scalia’s solution, though, would be to abandon the individualized sentencing principle
as a constitutional requirement. Id. at 673. Likewise, Justice Thomas has serious
qualms about the rationality of the existing system. See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S.
461, 494 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“When our review of death penalty
procedures turns on whether jurors can give ‘full mitigating effect’ to a defendant’s
background and character, and on whether juries are free to disregard the State’s
chosen sentencing criteria and return a verdict that a majority of this Court will label
‘moral,’ we have thrown open the back door to arbitrary and irrational sentencing.”).
Justice Thomas’s solution is to substantially deregulate the constitutional requirement
for sentencers’ consideration of mitigating evidence, allowing jurisdictions to “channel
the sentencer’s consideration of a defendant’s arguably mitigating evidence so as to
limit the relevance of that evidence in any reasonable manner, so long as the State
does not deny a defendant a full and fair opportunity to apprise the sentencer of all
constitutionally relevant circumstances.” Id. at 498-99.
211
See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 125 S.Ct. 2456 (2005) (reversing death
sentence for ineffective assistance of counsel); Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S.Ct. 2317
(2005) (reversing capital conviction because prosecutor unconstitutionally exercised
peremptory challenges on the basis of race); Deck v. Missouri, 125 S.Ct. 2007 (2005)
(reversing death sentence because defendant was shackled in the jury’s presence
without any special indicia of dangerousness); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)
(holding death sentence unconstitutional for offenders who were less than eighteen
years of age at the time of the murder); Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 703-05 (2004)
(holding that death-sentenced Texas defendant could raise claim in federal habeas case
that exculpatory evidence regarding witness’s government informant status had been
wrongly withheld, having established cause and prejudice to avoid procedural default);
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537-38 (2003) (finding inadequate investigation of
possible mitigation evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel); Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding death sentence unconstitutional for
defendant who was mentally retarded at the time of the murder).
212
In an earlier article, I argued that the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence
had achieved mild success in decreasing over-inclusion. See McCord, Judging the
Effectiveness, supra note 45, at 595. I stand by that conclusion. But a modest decrease
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would be extremely difficult for a Justice to admit this colossal
mistake, it is not impossible, as is evidenced by Justice
Blackmun’s end-of-career turnabout.213
Suppose five Justices made similar turnabouts. What
would that mean for more than 3400 other death row inmates?
One would hope for a decision that would be equally damning
to all states’ systems, as was the decision in Furman. Recall
that in Furman the commonality of all the state systems in
allowing unfettered discretion to the sentencer meant all those
systems were doomed. The common failings one would hope
the Court would find in current systems include:
Lack of state-level oversight to assure consistent
decision making across all counties in seeking or not
seeking death sentences; 214
Lack of state-level funding to assure that county-level
resource shortfalls are not the cause of foregoing
seeking death sentences; and to assure well-trained and
compensated capital defenders and support services;
Lack of any controls over prosecutorial discretion to
pursue/not pursue death sentences;
Lack of sufficiently tightly drawn standards of deatheligibility to screen out all insufficiently aggravated
murderers.
Arbitrariness from requiring unanimous jury verdicts
for death.215
in over-inclusion does not suffice to make the death penalty system non-arbitrary, as I
hope the current Article demonstrates.
213
See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
214
The federal system, in which there is centralized oversight for decisions to
seek or forego death sentences, does a fairly good job of selecting only highly
aggravated cases to take to sentencers. Here are the federal cases in the databases,
with the number of depravity points for each in parentheses: in App. D, DS 12 (30
points), 20 (23 points), 22 (22 points), 43 (16 points), 54 (15 points), 82 (11 points), 93
(10 points); and in App. E, SS 4 (29 points), 5 (29 points), 41 (11 points), 42 (11 points),
46 (11 points), 47 (11 points), 64 (8 points), 86 (6 points), 109 (4 points), 114 (4 points).
The federal system does not select all of the most aggravated defendants, though, nor
did it achieve a particularly impressive death-sentencing rate with sentencers, thereby
demonstrating the difficulty in creating a non-arbitrary system. Yet the results—a
marginally robust 41% death-sentencing rate in cases that went to a death penalty
decision by a sentencer—underscores the difficulty of creating a non-arbitrary system.
215
The Court has permitted the use of non-unanimous verdicts in criminal
cases. See Apodoca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972) (guilty verdict by nine of twelve
jurors is constitutionally acceptable). But it would require standing history and
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One would then hope for one thing further from the
Court—for it to simultaneously vacate all the death sentences
on its docket, just as it did in conjunction with Furman. This
would send two necessary messages. First, it would indicate
that individual states do not have the chance to argue that
their systems are not arbitrary. Second, it would indicate that
the decision is for the benefit of all currently death-sentenced
inmates, regardless of whether they have a direct appeal
pending; that is, that the decision has complete retroactive
effect. This would empty death rows of their over 3400
inmates, just as Furman emptied death rows of over 600
inmates.
Such a result would be extraordinary, just as Furman
was. The Court does, however, have an oft-affirmed doctrinal
device that can be used to justify radical departures from
constitutional doctrines that prevail as to non-death cases:
“Death is different.”216
CONCLUSION: WHAT IF . . .
If the Court accepted a renewed Furman argument, and
stopped the current death-sentencing system dead in its
tracks—what would happen then? Undoubtedly, just what
happened after Furman—the committed death penalty states
would go back to the drawing boards and create new systems.
There are, admittedly, rational approaches to attempt to
construct a non-arbitrary system.217 But can any system
operate non-arbitrarily? We have tried for over three hundred
years to create a non-arbitrary system in the United States.
Nobody believes we have succeeded at any point along the way.
After such extensive failed experimentation, is there any
persuasive reason to believe that a non-arbitrary death penalty
system, even if theoretically imaginable, is practically
attainable?
tradition on its head for the Court to ban the use of unanimous verdicts in the penalty
phase of capital cases. Yet such a holding would be required if the Court truly wanted
to achieve a non-arbitrary death penalty system.
216
The whole of the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence is premised on the
proposition that death is so different from any other punishment that it requires
special constitutional safeguards.
See Jeffrey Abramson, Death-is-Different
Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital Jury, 2 OH. ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 117 n.1
(2004) (collecting cases citing this proposition).
217
See, e.g., David McCord, An Open Letter To Governor George Ryan
Concerning How to Fix the Death Penalty System, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 451, 452 (2001)
(recommending changes that might result in a less arbitrary death penalty system).

